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Abstract 
 
Energy security is a subjective concept, as to different actors it invokes different 
meanings and thoughts about risk. It is highly political because it is at the heart 
of the debate between the environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels 
and the economic consequences of constraining this consumption. How a 
government perceives energy security provides an important indication of how 
they intend to approach the complexity of current energy issues. No more 
important is energy security to consider than in New Zealand. As this thesis will 
show, the term is used in New Zealand’s policy­making circles but it is not 
referred to consistently. This thesis will use the Copenhagen School’s Theory of 
Securitisation and delineate the key features of energy security in New Zealand 
politics. It will show that there has been two distinct rhetorical politicisations of 
energy security that argue for two divergent energy policies. First, the Clark 
Labour Government used a strategy of politicisation to bring energy security 
risks onto the political agenda. This sought to legitimise strong government 
leadership in the energy sector to support the development of robust climate 
change policy.  The second rhetorical politicisation is at the heart of the Key 
National Government, where energy security is subsumed to the immediate 
concern for economic growth in the wake of the global economic recession. Thus 
there is a heightened concern for short­term risk to security of energy supply and 
New Zealand’s role in contributing to global energy security. The nature of 
energy security issues and how they are integrated with other policy challenges 
remain in dispute. Consequently, energy security is a highly contested and 
politicised concept in New Zealand politics.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Energy security is the cornerstone of a well­functioning economy and a nation’s 
standard of living. The challenges of climate change and increasing global 
demand for energy have deepened international debate on what energy security 
means today, and how it can be achieved in domestic policy in both 
environmental and economic terms. This thesis examines how energy security is 
understood in New Zealand politics and the role it has had in energy policy­
formation. It asks whether energy security has been politicised in New Zealand 
politics and if so, how has it been politicised? And finally, has politicisation of 
energy security helped or hindered energy policy formation? To answer these 
questions I argue that it is necessary to analyse how government presents risks to 
the energy system, and how those risks are responded to in policy­making. This 
thesis will therefore provide a detailed analysis of the political debate concerning 
New Zealand’s policy response to the challenges of climate change and economic 
growth, at the heart of which is energy security. I aim to contribute wider 
understanding of what shapes and informs energy policy in New Zealand, how 
politicisation of energy security has affected this process, and give insight into 
the nature of the country’s energy politics. 
 
The politics of energy security in New Zealand has not been analysed in 
academic literature. I seek to fill this gap and in doing so, demonstrate that 
energy security has been politicised in policy­formation. I argue that while 
politicisation has raised the profile of energy security in energy policy, discourse 
on energy security remains contestable and inchoate. The thesis will demonstrate 
this by highlighting two competing perceptions of risks that are shaped by two 
distinct political agendas.  The first political agenda is epitomised by the Clark 
Labour Government: a strategy of politicisation was used to bring long­term risks 
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to energy security to the forefront of energy policy. Its energy security rhetoric 
aimed to legitimise robust climate change policy.  The opposing political agenda 
is influenced by the Key National Government’s goal of economic growth and 
key stakeholders in the energy market who favour a business­as­usual approach 
in energy policy. The Key Government has kept energy security as a policy focus, 
but conceptualises risk differently: emphasis is on short­term risks to security of 
supply and global energy security.  This energy security rhetoric aimed to 
legitimise more robust policy to exploit New Zealand’s petroleum and mineral 
reserves. The politicisation of energy security has therefore lead to greater 
divergence in energy policy. This is problematic for the development of a 
coherent domestic and international policy approach to the challenges of climate 
change and the energy market. But politicisation has also meant the energy 
security remains a contested concept in policy debate. International policy­
makers and academics recognise that the concept of energy security needs to be 
re­evaluated in light of new challenges. Thus politicisation has helped stir a 
necessary debate in New Zealand. This debate challenges perceptions of energy 
security and policy, relative to the other pertinent energy, economic and 
environmental issues on the political agenda. 
 
The Introduction is in four sections. The first section will explore energy security 
in international politics. It will show why it has been elevated to the top of 
governments’ political agendas in recent times. First, the challenges of climate 
change and the global energy market are inexorably linked to energy security. 
Second, the concept of energy security needs to change in light of these 
challenges. Third, the way governments interpret energy security affects how 
they deal with the aforementioned challenges. Thus energy security is a highly 
politicised and debated concept. The second section will explore how energy 
security is referenced in New Zealand energy debate. It will establish that further 
investigation of the concept is needed as it is contested and its place in energy 
policy is not clear. On the basis of these two sections, the third section will briefly 
show how the Copenhagen School’s Theory of Securitisation is appropriate for 
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an analysis of energy security in New Zealand politics. Securitisation Theory 
analyses the processes and dynamics behind how issues are brought to the 
forefront of political agendas. Its framework will give a more in­depth 
understanding of how and why energy security has been interpreted in New 
Zealand politics and policy. The final section provides an outline of the thesis. It 
will reiterate the three central questions and show how they will be addressed by 
giving summaries of the arguments in each Chapter.  
 
Energy security in international politics 
 
Energy security is a highly politicised concept in recent times because of the twin 
challenges of climate change and shifts in the global energy market.1 When an 
issue is politicised it is brought to the forefront of political debate and prioritised 
in policy­formation. In the report Energy Security in Europe: proceedings from 
the Conference “Energy Security in Europe,” it states that since 2006, the energy 
security and climate change nexus has been prioritised in political agendas across 
the world.2 This is because climate change injects much uncertainty in regards to 
the future of the energy system, and the nature of risks to this system. Alan 
DuPont argues that ‘Climate change will complicate energy choices and heighten 
anxieties about future supplies of energy, particularly oil, as the transition from 
highly polluting fossil fuels to cleaner sources of energy gathers speed.’3  
 
The invigorated international concern for energy security continues to the 
present day. For nations at the G20 summit in November, 2010, concerns over 
energy security were seen to be deepening because of increasing energy demand 
triggered by economic growth and a continued heavy dependence of this growth 
                                                          
1Bo Petersson and Barbara Tornquist­Plewa, "Energy Security in Europe: Proceedings from the 
Conference "Energy Security in Europe"" (paper presented at the The CFE Conference papers, 
Lund, Sweden, 2008). P. 7   
2 Ibid. p. 7 
3 Alan Dupont, "Climate Change and Security: Managing the Risk," Garnaut Climate Change 
Review(June 2008), 
http://www.garnautreview.org.au/CA25734E0016A131/WebObj/05Security/$File/05%20Secur
ity.pdf. P. 17 
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on fossil fuels.4 Two key drivers of market changes and concerns for energy 
security are China and India,5 whose rapid economic growth has spurred fears 
for the ability of the energy market to continue meeting this demand.6 As Nobuo 
Tanaka, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) has noted: 
how China ‘responds to the threats to global energy security and climate posed 
by rising fossil­fuel use will have far­reaching consequences for the rest of the 
world.’7  
 
Energy security remains a key concern in international climate change policy. In 
his remarks to the Climate Change Conference in Cancun, 7 December 2010, 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki­Moon stated that ‘We will never assure 
energy security – or international security – without climate security.’8 In the 
regional context, on the 19 June 2010 the ninth meeting of the Energy Ministers of 
the Asia­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) negotiated under the theme ‘Low 
Carbon Paths to Energy Security.’9 In 2007 at the East Asia Summit in Cebu, New 
Zealand as well as a number of other Association of South­east Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) member countries signed the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy 
Security. The declaration recognised the problems of the world supply of oil and 
                                                          
4 Luo Laiming, "More Global Cooperation Needed to Ensure Energy Security: G20 Business 
Summit," Xinhua, http://english.cri.cn/6826/2010/11/11/2742s604462.htm. 
5  David G Victor and Linda Yueh, "The New Energy Order," Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 
(January/February 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65897/david­g­victor­and­
linda­yueh/the­new­energy­order. P. 1; Tsutomu Toichi, "Asian Energy Demand and 
Competition," in IISS­JIIA Asia's Strategic Challenges: In Search of a Common Agenda (Hotel Okura, 
Tokyo: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2­4 June 2008).; UPI, "Does Beijing Hold 
Key to Energy Security?," UPI.com(9 November 2010), 
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource­Wars/2010/11/09/Does­Beijing­hold­key­to­
energy­security/UPI­76901289313937/.;Tsutomu Toichi, "First Session ­ Asian Energy Insecurity," 
in IISS­JIIA Conference "Asia Energy Demand and Competition" (Hotel Okura, Tokyo, Japan2 ­ 4 June 
2008).; 
6 UPI, "Does Beijing Hold Key to Energy Security?." At the launch of the World Energy Outlook 
2010, Nobuo Tanaka, the executive director of the IEA, stated that "[t]he energy world is facing 
unprecedented uncertainty […]" 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ban Ki­moon, "Remarks to Climate Change Conference (Unfccc Cop16 High­Level Segment) ­ as 
Delievered," un.org, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1028. 
9 APEC, "Apec Energy Ministers Focus on Low­Carbon Energy Security,"  http://climate­
l.iisd.org/news/apec­energy­ministers­focus­on­low­carbon­energy­security/. 
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unstable prices, as well as the urgent need to address global warming, and the 
previous agreement to enhance cooperation through promoting energy 
security.10  
 
But the different rhetoric and approaches beg a central question: what is energy 
security and what makes it so politically important? First and foremost, energy 
security is important because it is a basic condition for a well­functioning 
economy and therefore in governments’ political interests to maintain. In its 
World Energy Outlook 2007, the International Energy Agency (IEA) defined 
energy security as the ‘[…] adequate, affordable, and reliable supplies of 
energy.’11  Energy security is the reliable supply of energy to households, to 
businesses, and therefore is part of the staple diet for a well­functioning economy 
and the standard of living a nation enjoys.  
 
The link between the economy and energy security is clear, and is reflected in 
governments’ definitions of the term. In a report by the Economic Commission 
for Europe, energy security was proposed as ‘the availability of usable energy 
supplies, at the point of final consumption, at economic price levels and in 
sufficient quantities and timelessness so that, given due regard to encouraging 
energy efficiency, the economic and social development of a country is not 
materially constrained.’12 Similarly, the Australian government defines energy 
security in its National Energy Security Assessment, as ‘the adequate, reliable 
and affordable provision of energy to support the functioning of the economy 
and social development […]’ 13  Energy security, it is implied, is not only 
connected to the economy but to the broader well­being of a nation.   
                                                          
10 ASEAN, "Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security," aseansec.org, 
http://www.aseansec.org/19319.htm. 
11 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights (Paris: International Energy Agency, 
2007). P. 162  
12 Economic Commission for Europe, "Emerging Energy Security Risks and Risk Mitigation in a 
Global Context," in ECE Energy Series, ed. United Nations (New York and Geneva2007). P. 8 
13 Australian Government, "National Energy Security Assessment 2009," (Canberra, Australia, 
2009). www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy%20Security/National­Energy­Security­ 
Assessment­2009.pdf  
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Something that threatens energy security therefore, has political implications. As 
Buzan et al. highlight ‘[p]atterns of employment and welfare expectation get 
rooted in domestic life of the nation and pose serious political problems when the 
economic conditions necessary for their maintenance disappear.’14 Governments 
have a vested interest in maintaining energy security and addressing energy 
security risks when they arise. For the most part these risks will not be brought to 
public attention until the lights do not turn on, or the petrol does not arrive at the 
pump.15 For instance, New Zealand faced extreme dry periods in 1992, 2001 and 
2003, placing considerable pressure on electricity supply from the hydro­dams. 
This spurred the Clark Labour Government to implement national energy 
savings campaigns to reduce the risk of shortages.16 A more subtle response to 
energy security risks is found in the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Strategy, made under the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act 2000. Goal 5 of 
this strategy, according to Barry Barton, was ‘to improve resilience to future 
energy supply disruptions and energy price shocks which was to be 
implemented through education rather than regulation.17   
 
Energy security is also political because it spurs debate. This is particularly the 
case today, because energy security risks are more complex for policymakers to 
address.18 Thus new energy concerns have invigorated debate about what risks 
to energy security are and how they should be addressed in policy. Energy 
security has been traditionally defined as the adequate, reliable and secure 
                                                          
14 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998). P. 20 
15 Dr. Richard Hawke, Interview, 2011 
16 Ministry of Economic Development, "Sustainable Energy ­ Summary," in New Zealand 
Government's Sustainable Development Programme of Action (Wellington2004). p. 3; see also Barry 
Barton et al., Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal Environment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). P. 373 ­ 374 
17 Barry Barton et al., Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal Environment. P. 377 
18 Economic Commission for Europe, "Investing in Energy Security Mitigation," in Energy Series, 
ed. United Nations (New York and Geneva2008). P. 1; Joan MacNaughton, "Cooperating on 
Energy Policy: The Work of the International Energy Agency," in The New Economic Diplomacy: 
Decision­Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, ed. Nicolas Bayne; Stephen 
Woolcock (Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2007). P. 293.; Dieter Helm, "Energy Policy: Security of 
Supply, Sustainability and Competition," Energy Policy 30, no. 3 (February 2002). p. 182. 
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supply of energy,19 but this simple definition has been criticised by scholars and 
policymakers as insufficient for today’s world. First, the simple definition entails 
a narrow perception of risks to the energy system. As Philip Andrews­Speed and 
Anthony Froggatt argue, terms of reliability, or similar, reflect the threat of 
disruption to supply, and affordable reflects the potential macroeconomic effects 
of sudden price spikes.20 The World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda on 
Energy Security however, states that energy security is ‘the reliable, stable and 
sustainable supply of energy at affordable prices and at an acceptable social 
cost.’21 Linda Yueh argues that this captures risks and issues, environmental and 
other, that are ‘inexorably linked with those of energy.’22 Likewise, the RSIS 
Centre for Non­Traditional Security (NTS) argued that among the traditional 
tenet of the economy and security of supplies, environmental and socio­political 
issues add to new concerns to be addressed.23 On the other hand, most recently 
and more broadly, Vlado Vivoda argued that the concept of energy security must 
change in order to meet new challenges in the Asia­Pacific region, and likewise 
John V. Mitchell called for similar in the European context.24  
 
The politics of energy security emerges from the question of how governments 
will manage the complexity of economic growth, climate change, and the 
recognition of how a government deals with energy is at the centre of both. This 
recognition was evident during the 2005 UK Prime Minister’s presidency of the 
                                                          
19 Xu Yi­Chong, "China's Energy Security," in Energy Security in Asia, ed. Michael Wesley (New 
York: Routledge, 2007). p. 42 
20Philip Andrews­Speed, "Energy Security in East Asia: A European View," in Symposium on 
Pacific Energy Cooperation 2003 (Tokyo2003).  P. 2; Antony Froggatt and Michael A Levi, "Climate 
and Energy Security Policies and Measures: Synergies and Conflicts," International Affairs 85, no. 6 
(2009). P. 6 
21 Linda Yueh, "An International Approach to Energy Security," Global Policy 1, no. 2 (May 2010).p. 
216 
22 Ibid. p. 216 
23 RSIS Centre for Non­Traditional Security Studies, "Executive Summary," in RSIS­NTS Workshop 
on Nuclear Energy and Human Security 
 (Traders Hotel, Singapore: S. Rajarantnam School of International Studies, 23 April 2010). P. 1; 
Daniel Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006). P. 69 
24 J. V. Mitchell, "Energy Supply Security: Changes in Concepts," in Seminaire Europeen sur la 
Securite d'approvisionnement Energetique 
 (Paris Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, 2000).; John V. Mitchell, "Renewing Energy 
Security," The Royal Institute of International Affairs: Sustainable Development Programme (July 2002). 
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G8 and cooperation with the IEA, in which energy was placed at the heart of the 
climate change agenda.25 This reflects Anthony Giddens argument that “[i]t is 
certainly vital to relate the climate change debate to that over energy security, 
where again the state has a prime part to play.”26 It is no surprise then that 
energy security would be referred to more frequently by world leaders and 
officials in both international climate change, as well as institutions and forums 
dealing with global economic concerns. First, debating energy security and 
climate change invites thoughts about how energy is consumed and the effects of 
this process. The use of fossil fuels supports modern economies but also 
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, thereby exacerbating the risks of climate 
change. Second, addressing risks to energy security implicitly involves 
addressing risks to the economy. And in this current environment, addressing 
such risks naturally encompasses issues associated with the global energy market. 
These issues include whether the world will have enough energy to meet future 
demand, and whether meeting this demand can be achieved while addressing 
climate change. So, how does energy security play out in New Zealand politics? 
How are energy security risks presented and addressed in national policy? 
 
Energy security in New Zealand politics 
 
New Zealand government departments refer to energy security in policy 
documents, as do politicians and bureaucrats in speeches and media releases. 
The Ministry of Economic Development’s (MED) New Zealand Energy Strategy 
released in 2011 (NZES 2011), states that ‘High standards of energy security are 
critical to New Zealand’s economic performance and social wellbeing ­ 
particularly in relation to oil and electricity.’27 It does not give a clear definition of 
what energy security is. However, it does suggest how energy security is 
                                                          
25 MacNaughton, "Cooperating on Energy Policy: The Work of the International Energy Agency." 
P. 288 ­289. 
26 Anthony Giddens, "The Politics of Climate Change: National Responses to the Challenges of 
Global Warming," www.policy­network.net(September 2008). p. 15  
27 Ministry of Economic Development, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing 
Our Energy Potential," (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011). P. 12 
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achieved, and how it is enhanced by different policy measures. This includes 
diversifying resources and maintaining a resilient energy infrastructure that can 
cope with shocks, change or supply disruptions.28  
 
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand Ambassador to 
Climate Change Jo Tyndall stated in a speech delivered at the University of 
Otago, that ‘[r]ather than economic development at all costs, the watch­word 
seems to be sustainable economic development. Food security, energy security, 
and water security are three fundamental priorities for all governments around 
the world.’29 In an opening address to the New Zealand Petroleum Conference in 
September 2010, the Minister for Energy and Resources Hon Gerry Brownlee 
stated that significant deposits of hydrates ‘could provide either a long term 
underpinning of energy security for the country […]’30 Prior to the election of the 
John Key’s National government, Brownlee stated as National Party energy 
spokesperson, that a ‘National­led Government will maintain an unrelenting 
focus on security of energy supply.’31 The Ministry for the Environment, in a 
discussion paper on Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in New 
Zealand Post­2012, stated that it was in New Zealand’s national interest to 
pursue GHG emissions reductions for the co­benefits of ‘economic development, 
energy security and local environmental gains.’32 Energy security evidently is 
linked to the New Zealand economy and has a clear relationship with reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).  
 
                                                          
28 ———, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing Our Energy Potential," 
(Ministry of Economic Development, August 2011).p. 13 
29 Jo Tyndall, "Global Collaboration Towards Sustainability and Climate Change," in PIM 
Conference (University of Otago: business.otago.ac.nz, 11 November 2010). 
30 Hon Gerry Brownlee, "Opening Address to the New Zealand Petroleum Conference" (paper 
presented at the Petroleum Conference, 20 September 2010). 
31 Hon. Gerry Brownlee, "Security Underlines National's Energy Policy," national.org.nz, 
http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=28380. 
32 Ministry for the Environment, "Discussion Paper on Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in New Zealand Post­2012," mfe.govt.nz, 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/discussion­paper­post­2012­
dec06/html/page3.html. 
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Energy security was also referred to under the Clark Government, particularly in 
the New Zealand Energy Strategy released by MED in October 2007 and by the 
Hon David Parker. Hon David Parker, as both Minister for Energy and Minister 
Responsible for Climate Change issues, referred to energy security in his 
speeches and public addresses. In an address to the Hampden Energy Future 
Forum in 2006, Parker spoke of peak ‘cheap’ oil and energy security concerns that 
oil will run out or get more expensive, but stated that ‘While the Government is 
concerned about threats to oil security, we don't expect it to run out.’33 Second, 
the ‘Government believes the more serious and more immediate problem is 
climate change.’ 34  Then in a speech to the Electrical Engineers Association 
Conference in 2007, Parker stated that ‘Energy security is, of course, paramount, 
and renewable energy has a vital part to play;’ expressing the desire to provide 
more regulatory certainty for renewable energy. This was to be achieved through 
finalising the NZES 2007 and preparing a National Policy Statement, as well as 
‘making greater use of the Minister for the Environment’s call­in power.’ 35 
Evidently in the Clark Government, as is also the case with the Key National 
Government, energy security is linked to the economy and reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, and a more robust role of government in the energy sector. 
 
The NZES 2007 and 2011 refer to the challenges of energy security and climate 
change in slightly different ways. The NZES 2011 refers to these challenges in the 
global context, and in particular, states that New Zealand can contribute to global 
energy security through the development of petroleum resources.36 The NZES 
2007 does not, and tends to identify energy security and climate change as two 
challenges that the Clark Government would provide leadership on.37 The NZES 
                                                          
33 David Parker, "David Parker Speech: The End of Cheap Oil," Scoop.co.nz, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0611/S00004.htm. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hon. David Parker, "Speech to Electrical Engineers Association Conference 2007," 
beehive.govt.co.nz, http://www.eea.co.nz/Attachment?Action=View&Attachment_id=447. 
36 Ministry of Economic Development, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing 
Our Energy Potential." P. 3 
37 ———, "New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050: Powering Our Future," (Ministry of Economic 
Development, October 2007). P. 5 
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2007 also stated that in the development of the strategic direction of New 
Zealand’s energy system, ‘we have weighed up a number of important 
considerations. Two major issues are energy security and climate greenhouse gas 
emissions.’ 38  The energy costs impacted on by different choices were also 
included in the formation of the strategy. Clearly the Clark Government 
considered energy security an important issue for consideration in developing 
energy strategy. The Key Government also perceives energy security as an 
important issue as well as global energy security.  These issues will have a role in 
policy­formation.  
 
Current foreign policy does not reference global energy security in the same way 
as the NZES 2011. This is another difference between the two Governments’ 
approaches to energy security.  Where energy security was present in the 
Statement of Intents released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) under the Clark Government, any similar references are absent in 
current strategy. In the Clark Government, foreign policy presented climate 
change and energy security as key concerns for the regional architecture of the 
Asia­Pacific. The White Paper entitled Our Future with Asia, released in 2007, 
argued that the region was becoming more concerned with results of economic 
growth and success. This included references to growing resource competition 
which include both energy and environmental problems, adding that ‘[t]he 
challenges of dealing with climate change and energy security are becoming 
priority areas for Asian countries, and New Zealand has a stake in how the 
region deals with these issues.”39 MFAT’s Statement of Intent 2007 highlighted 
the global issue of energy security several times in reference to dominant trends, 
where ‘[t]he integration of worldwide markets for labour, goods, services, capital, 
and technology is quickening, with increasing competition for natural resources 
and energy security.’40 This is mentioned in conjunction with rapid economic 
                                                          
38 Ibid. p. 27 
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Our Future with Asia," (Wellington2007). P. 26 
40 ———, "Statement of Intent 2007­2010 Incorporating the Forecast Financial Statements for 
2007/08," (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,, 2007). P. 14 
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development of China and India, and the accelerating pace of economic and 
political integration at the regional level, especially in the Asia­Pacific. These 
trends place pressure on countries, especially New Zealand, ‘to be more globally 
active and equipped to respond to a rapidly changing and less predictable 
world.’ 41  Energy security is also mentioned in regards to sustainability and 
climate change.42 In this respect, the domestic energy strategy was consistent 
with the foreign policy agenda. 
 
Energy security in New Zealand is referred to in a variety of instances, as part of 
energy policy and dialogue, or presented publicly to different audiences by 
different government actors. It has a role in political discourse and policy 
formation. There are subtle differences, however, between the Labour­led and 
National­led energy policies, and there has also been heated debate. One 
difference shown here is that the NZES 2007 identified energy security and 
climate change as issues to be addressed, with a focus on climate change and a 
push for policy on renewable energy. The NZES 2007 was criticised by ‘[s]ome 
major energy users and other business interests [who] believed the draft strategy 
was too weighted towards climate change, at the expense of security of supply 
and economic growth […]’ 43  The current NZES 2011 does identify energy 
security as a challenge and a priority area that will help achieve the government’s 
goal of economic growth. 44  Second, the NZES 2011 makes reference to the 
contribution New Zealand can make to global energy security by the 
development of both renewable and non­renewable resources.  
 
The debate is clearly continuing: this is evident in debate between Labour and 
National MPs on previous and current energy strategy. This debate is not just a 
question of approaches to energy security, but also about what risks to energy 
security they perceive are the most important and how they can be addressed in 
                                                          
41 Ibid. P. 14 
42 Ibid. p. 15;  
43 Ministry of Economic Development, "New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050: Powering Our 
Future." P. 9 
44 ———, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing Our Energy Potential." P. 1 
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policy. Hon Gerry Brownlee argued that ‘Improving energy security and energy 
affordability are key concerns […] In my view, these issues were not accorded a 
sufficiently strong priority in the 2007 NZES.’ 45  Comparatively the current 
Labour spokesperson for energy Charles Chauvel, argues that National is failing 
to set clear priorities in the energy sector as well as make energy security and 
affordability priorities. 46  He also argues that an incoming Labour­led 
Government will reissue a detailed New Zealand Energy Strategy built on 
current and previous strategy, but specifying ‘that domestic energy security is of 
cardinal importance, to be achieved bearing in mind the twin imperatives of 
affordability to consumers; and the need to fully maximise our renewable 
advantage.’47 
 
This thesis will show that energy security has been politicised in New Zealand 
politics. In doing so, I will show that the Clark and Key Governments interpret 
and present energy security risks in different ways. I will argue that this is 
because of, and is driven by, distinct priorities in their political agendas. Second, 
that it this not simply a disagreement between the Key Government and the 
Labour Opposition over how best to address risks to the energy system, but at 
the core are different perceptions of energy security. Key stakeholders and 
market participants also have divisive views on energy security. The two 
governments structured two different rhetorical politicisations to appease their 
constituencies, and to prioritise energy security issues that support their policy 
initiatives. Thus politicisation has led to divergence in New Zealand’s energy 
policy. This is problematic because it creates political uncertainty in the domestic 
energy market. This could be used to stall the development of climate change 
policy. Alternatively, politicisation of energy security is good because it stirs 
                                                          
45 Hon Gerry Brownlee, "Government Consulting on Energy Policy," www.med.govt.nz, 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____44122.aspx. 
46 Charles Chauvel, "No­Show Brownlee's Got No Plan," labour.org.nz, 
http://www.labour.org.nz/news/no­show­brownlee%E2%80%99s­got­no­plan. 
47 ———, "Energy and Resources Policy in New Zealand: Where's the Plan?," labour.org.nz, 
http://www.labour.org.nz/news/energy­and­resources­policy­new­zealand­
where%E2%80%99s­plan. 
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debate on what risks to the energy system are. This is highly relevant given how 
the international energy debate has been unfolding.  
 
The Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation 
 
I will argue that the Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation provides the 
necessary framework to analyse how energy security has been politicised in New 
Zealand. The Copenhagen School understands that actors use security rhetoric to 
raise the salience of an issue on the political agenda. Furthermore, by using 
security rhetoric, an actor argues that the issue needs to be governed within or 
above politics. This process can result in different outcomes that are dependent 
on context. First, the Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation argues that 
security is an inter­subjective process and socially constructed.48 Second, they 
argue that the language of threat and risk are inherent to political processes that 
construct ideas about security. Actors invoke the language of threat in order to 
present an issue as a case of some urgency and survival, and to argue that it 
should be prioritised above other issues. 49  Actors can frame these issues in 
different ways, for instance, in environmental, economic or military terms. 
Finally, given the right conditions, the risk presented by the actor may be 
accepted by an audience and acted upon within or above politics. 
 
This thesis also seeks to examine how energy security risks are presented and 
how they affect the process of energy policy formation. Securitisation Theory in 
this respect, argues that the language of threat, risk or vulnerability, has tactical 
appeal. The language of threat is used to elevate an issue to the top of the 
political agenda, to encourage the issue be prioritised and addressed within or 
above politics. Security is as much about the art of persuasion, convincing 
another of the saliency of an issue, as it is about traditional­military 
understanding of conflict. Buzan et al. distinguish themselves from the 
                                                          
48 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 57, 197, 31 
49 Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond," European 
Journal of International Relations 13, no. 357 (2007). P. 360 
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traditionalist agenda of security studies by arguing that a successful 
securitisation can never only be imposed through coercion, that ‘there is some 
need to argue one’s case.’50 Or in other words, a securitising actor must convince 
another that an issue is threatening enough to survival that it requires the 
violation of rules and normal political procedure, by emergency action.51 This of 
course does not just mean that an issue is addressed through emergency action 
only. An issue can be politicised, that is to say, it is given priority in political 
debate and governed through policy initiatives.  
 
On these theoretical foundations Securitisation Theory identifies the who, what, 
where and how of a security concept, and yields a more in­depth understanding 
of risk perceptions in political debate and how these risks are responded to in 
policy.52 Securitisation Theory can therefore unpack how risks are presented in 
New Zealand politics and give a detailed analysis on the political debate on 
energy security.   
 
This thesis will apply Securitisation Theory to energy security in New Zealand 
energy politics and policy. I am interested in the politics of energy security, 
particularly how strategies of politicisation have affected the formation of energy 
policy in New Zealand. I will therefore analyse key energy policy documents, 
reports, discussions and, speeches and media releases by relevant politicians and 
bureaucrats, news articles in the New Zealand media, as well as broader political 
dialogue on energy policy between government and their audience: key 
stakeholders. Key stakeholders include those involved in the energy sector, such 
as companies, associations, community groups, councils and individuals, as well 
as political parties. This thesis will also be informed by face­to­face discussions 
with politicians, bureaucrats and academics that are involved in energy policy or 
specialise in New Zealand energy security and policy. Labour MP David Parker 
                                                          
50 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 25 
51 Ibid. p. 57, 197, 31 
52 Felix Ciuta, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation 
Theory," Review of International Studies, no. 35 (2009). P. 301 
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will be interviewed in regards to his role as Minister of Energy in the 
development of the NZES 2007. Unfortunately current Ministers under the 
National Government were sought but unable to be contacted. These included 
the acting Minister for Energy and Resources Hon Hekia Parata, and Hon Dr 
Nick Smith, Minister for Climate Change Issues. Dr Richard Hawke, the Manager 
of Energy and the Environment in the Ministry of Economic Development was 
able to be interviewed, as was Stuart Calman, Director of Climate Risk and Policy 
in the Ministry for the Environment. Key energy security academics in New 
Zealand, Professor Barry Barton from University of Waikato and Professor Ralph 
Sims from Massey University were also spoken with. 
 
Outline 
 
Has energy security been politicised in New Zealand? If so, how has it been 
politicised? Has politicisation of energy security helped or hindered energy 
policy formation? This thesis seeks to explore these questions across the 
following five chapters. Chapter Two will discuss what has been written on 
energy security in New Zealand politics. It will show that there is a major gap in 
critical analysis on this topic. It will argue that the Copenhagen School’s Theory 
of Securitisation can help us unpack the meaning of energy security by 
examining how it is referred to, by whom, and in what context. I argue the 
language of risk, threat and vulnerability continues to have its appeal in political 
debate on energy issues, where actors emphasise some risks over others in 
support of their policy objectives. The extent to which these risks are prioritised 
in substantive energy policy is the process of politicisation. This is relevant, in 
particular, to unpacking the current debate on energy security and climate 
change in New Zealand politics. 
 
Chapter Three will then apply this understanding of Securitisation Theory to 
how energy security was politicised in the Clark Labour Government’s New 
Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050: Powering our future. The chapter will argue 
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that the Clark Government used a strategy of politicisation to bring energy 
security risks onto the political agenda. The rhetoric of this politicisation sought 
to legitimise its robust climate change policy. I will show this by highlighting the 
features of its security argument used to promote its particular views on energy 
security risks and climate change policy. I will also show that this evident 
politicisation of energy security and climate change was consistent through 
government departments; demonstrative of a broader attempt to institutionalise 
a whole­of­government approach to energy security and climate change issues. 
 
Chapter Four will analyse the current New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: 
developing our energy potential. The chapter will show that energy security is 
referred to in a dramatically different way to the Clark Labour Government. The 
Key Government uses energy security rhetoric to legitimise the development of 
New Zealand’s petroleum and mineral resources. The rhetoric clearly shows a 
different conceptualisation of risk: energy security risks are not articulated using 
a security argument. Energy security is spoken in terms of security of supply 
subsumed to economic growth concerns. Furthermore, New Zealand’s role in 
contributing supply to meet the growing global demand for energy is another 
feature of its argument. Market processes are emphasised and coupled with more 
centralised approach to energy security in the Ministry of Economic 
Development, with the omission of the term from key foreign policy documents 
and activities. The Key Government uses a strategy of politicisation to legitimise 
robust policy on resource development for global and domestic energy security. 
This is in distinct comparison to the Clark Government’s policy focus on 
domestic and global leadership on climate change, and renewable resources.  
 
Chapter Five will explore the key reasons why this dramatic shift has occurred. It 
will argue that it is because of the open­ended nature of politicisation combined 
with three key factors; the formative stage of energy policy in New Zealand, 
divisive constituency views of energy security as well as domestic and 
international conditions. As a result, two distinct rhetorical arguments for energy 
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security have been used to legitimise the Key and Clark Government energy 
policies. First, the chapter will show how the incumbent government has a strong 
influence on the direction of policy and how, institutionally, energy security 
issues will be addressed. Second, it will show how the Clark and Key 
Governments faced opposition to, and constituency support for, their respective 
energy strategies. This divisive energy security discourse, combined with 
contextual economic and political factors, form the resonating conditions which 
have shaped the distinct policy responses to energy security. Politicisation is an 
open­ended process. Thus the Key Government adopted energy security from 
the Clark Government, and easily shaped an entirely different rhetoric in defence 
of its distinct energy strategy.  
 
The discussion in Chapter Six will summarise the analysis of the previous 
chapters and evaluate the consequences of the findings. It will suggest that while 
politicisation has given salience to energy security it has also lead to clear 
divergence in energy policy. The politics of energy security demonstrate that the 
nature and level of risks are indeed contested. The Clark Government identified 
risks to the energy system that the government would respond to through 
climate change policy. The Key National Government’s current strategy gives a 
clear signal that the energy market will respond to particular international trends: 
growing global demand for energy. This divergence, coupled with resonating 
conditions that were not ideal for the Clark Government’s politicisation of energy 
security, meant that politicisation has not been entirely successful towards the 
development of a coherent policy response to energy issues. Political uncertainty 
remains over New Zealand’s energy policy. The institutionalisation of a coherent 
domestic and international policy approach to energy security and climate 
change has also been limited. Granted, politicisation will hopefully mean that the 
issue remains contested and debated. The worst for New Zealand politics would 
be a stagnant energy debate given the international energy challenges the 
country will continue to face. 
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Chapter Two 
Energy Security and the Copenhagen School Theory 
of Securitisation 
 
It is clear that energy security has an important place in international debate on 
climate change and energy market concerns. Energy security also has a place in 
New Zealand energy policy, but exactly what place it holds is not clear. 
Furthermore, Labour and National politicians appear to perceive energy security 
differently. Has it been politicised and how? If politicians or bureaucrats present 
energy security risks in different ways, what does this mean for New Zealand’s 
response to complex energy challenges? Does the politicisation of energy security 
help or hinder this process? There is a substantial gap in the energy security and 
New Zealand politics literature that directly addresses these issues. At present 
the literature focuses on what energy policy options are available rather than 
analysing how energy security has been understood and addressed in New 
Zealand politics.  
 
This chapter will show how the Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation can 
be used to analyse energy security in New Zealand politics. Previous research on 
energy security has taken the term’s meaning for granted; as something objective 
in New Zealand. First, the securitisation framework of analysis can be used to 
examine how energy security risks are presented in New Zealand politics. The 
international literature shows that the language of threat, risk or vulnerability has 
been used in politics to bring energy issues to the fore of policy debate. When the 
issue is successfully brought to the debate, and made a part of policy, this is a 
politicisation. What risks have been prioritised in current and previous energy 
policy in New Zealand? How has energy security been politicised in New 
Zealand? Second, international literature also shows that energy security risks 
have been politicised and linked to the urgency to address climate change. 
Securitisation Theory can identify if this has occurred in New Zealand politics, as 
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it understands that issues can be viewed through different lenses; as 
environmental, economic or military issues. Energy security can be at once 
viewed as both an environmental issue (where it contributes to climate change) 
or an economic issue concerned with disruptions to energy supply. Have energy 
security risks been linked to New Zealand’s climate change debate, or do they 
remain separate to these concerns? 
 
New Zealand literature review 
 
For a concept that is increasingly part of the political lexicon, there has been a 
striking lack of research on the meaning of energy security in New Zealand. 
What research does exist tends to explore energy policy options rather than 
embarking on a critical examination of New Zealand’s concept of energy security 
and its place in politics. Two texts however, have engaged with this topic. First is 
Energy Security: The Foreign Policy Implications, edited by Brian Lynch, and 
second, Barry Barton’s analysis of New Zealand’s energy security concerns and 
policy entitled Reaching the Limits of What the Market Will Provide: Energy 
Security in New Zealand. The former analyses future energy policy options, the 
latter outlines New Zealand’s national approach to energy in policy. Some 
external factors of energy security are explored in Energy Security, for example, 
the Asia­Pacific’s increasing dependence on crude oil from the Middle­East with 
reflections on the region’s volatility and the possibility of oil supply disruptions. 
New Zealand’s foreign policy position or diplomacy options however, are not 
explored.53 This reflects the general tenor of the contributions which focus on 
domestic energy policy (such as the development of resources) rather than a 
critical study on what energy security actually is by analysing where and how it 
is referred to in politics.54   
                                                          
53 Brian Lynch, ed. Energy Security: The Foreign Policy Implications (Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs,2008). p. 13 ­ 17 
54 See  David F.S Natusch, "New Zealand's Energy Reserves as Strategic Assets," in Energy 
Security: The Foreign Policy Implications, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: The New Zealand Institute 
of International Affairs, 2008). p. 59 
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The meaning that energy security bears in politics has not been explored in New 
Zealand research. This can be explained by the fact that energy security has not 
had a strong role in legislation or policy in New Zealand. In Reaching the Limits 
of What the Market Will Provide: Energy Security in New Zealand, Barry Barton 
notes the lack of legal provision for the concept in New Zealand, but adds that 
energy security ‘problems’ exist despite this and whatever the policy mix.55 
Basically, New Zealand will never have comprehensive energy security, 
especially in regards to oil imports and the associated risks which are ‘largely out 
of the control of a small country.’56 New Zealand is exposed to international 
energy markets, and government simply has no power over the price or supply 
of energy from these markets. The other major text, Energy Security: The Foreign 
Policy Implications, is interested in how other states perceive energy security and 
how they act on it.  Brian Lynch states that the interest of the New Zealand study 
was to ‘examine the constellation of factors that comes into play […] and 
specifically those that propel a country’s efforts to ensure that it has continued 
access to a reliable and affordable supply of energy, in one or more of its forms.’57 
However, no study has analysed the evident debate on energy security in New 
Zealand. Nor have the risk perceptions of energy security been analysed, or how 
these perceptions are shaping energy policy.  
 
This chapter will elaborate on how Securitisation Theory can unpack New 
Zealand’s energy security debate in three sections. The first section will show 
how energy security is a highly subjective concept. This makes the Copenhagen 
School relevant given its understanding of security as inter­subjective and 
socially constructed. The second section will highlight how security arguments 
have been used in the climate change and energy security debate. Risk 
perceptions are therefore highly important to understand because they shape the 
                                                          
55 Barry Barton et al., Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal Environment (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). P. 389 
56 Ibid. P. 389 
57 Lynch, ed. Energy Security: The Foreign Policy Implications. P. 7 
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policy debate on how best to respond energy security and climate change 
concerns. Securitisation Theory can be used to analyse how energy security risks 
are presented by political actors in New Zealand, with consideration of the 
domestic policy environment. The third section will argue that politicisations of 
energy security risks are tactical moves that have real effects in politics and 
energy policy formation. Securitisation Theory can gauge whether energy 
security has been politicised in New Zealand and the effect this has had on 
energy policy formation.  
 
Risk perceptions and energy security theory 
 
The Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation is based on an understanding 
that security is inter­subjective and socially constructed.58 This makes the theory 
highly applicable to an analysis of energy security in New Zealand politics. First, 
it is commonly understood by scholars that meaning attributed to the term is 
highly subjective and context­dependent.  As noted previously, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) define energy security as the ‘[…] adequate, affordable, and 
reliable supplies of energy.’59 Yet according to Stuart Harris what is reasonable or 
affordable is more complicated.60 For these reasons also, scholars such as Terence 
O’Brien argue that the meaning of energy security must be understood as 
context­bound and dependent. 61  Perspectives on energy security will differ 
depending on different actors’ position in the ‘value­chain’ – as exporters or 
importers, business or policy­makers, developed or developing nations. Thus 
concerns for energy security can involve different geopolitical tensions, market 
                                                          
58 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 57, 197, 31 
59 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights. P. 162  
60 Stuart Harris and Barry Naughten, "Economic Dimensions of Energy Security in the Asia­
Pacific," in Energy Security in Asia, ed. Michael Wesley (New York: Routledge, 2007). P. 184 
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"Energy Security in Europe"".p. 227; Helm, "Energy Policy: Security of Supply, Sustainability and 
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structures, and energy infrastructure, to name but a few.62 This means that actors 
will attribute meaning to energy security in different ways, thereby perspectives 
of risks are equally subjective.  
 
The politics of energy security is as such a debate on the nature and level of risks 
to the energy system. Security, and risks to security, are in part a question of 
perception,63 and the number of actors that can have different views on energy 
security is broad. In the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change and Security, hosted in 2010, the 
language of threat was used by participants in the debate to emphasise different 
risks to energy security and climate change. On one hand it was argued that 
climate change directs threats to energy security, especially to existing energy 
infrastructure that can be damaged by natural disasters.64 On the other hand, it 
was also argued that the United States’ dependence on energy imports, especially 
petroleum resources, presented a serious threat to security because it weakens 
international leverage and exposes the U.S. to hostile regimes.65 In the same 
debate, another argued that portraying climate mitigation policies as ways to 
increase energy security is a wilful manipulation of the public.66 Naturally, these 
different perceptions have raised debate about what energy security is and how it 
should be addressed. 
 
Securitisation Theory can help understand the level of debate on energy security 
risks in New Zealand. Securitisation Theory identifies when the language of 
threat is used in New Zealand politics to prioritise an issue in energy policy. The 
                                                          
62 World Economic Forum and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, "The New Energy 
Security Paradigm," in World Economic Forum: Energy Vision Update (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, Spring 2006). p. 7; See also APERC, "Apec Energy Overview 2009," (The Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan, 2010). 
63 Harris and Naughten, "Economic Dimensions of Energy Security in the Asia­Pacific." P. 184 See 
also, Michael Wesley, Energy Security in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2007). p. 4 – 5  
64 Andrew Holland, "Climate Change and Energy Security: Overlapping Priorities," in IISS 
Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change and Security (Hyatt Regency Capitol Hill, Washington, 
D.C.: International institute for Strategic Studies, 16 March 2010). p. 5 
65 Ibid. p. 5 
66 Ibid. p. 5, 6  
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Copenhagen School refers to this as a securitising move: a political actor argues 
(using threat language) that an issue is a case of some urgency or survival, and 
that it should, therefore, be prioritised.67 The Copenhagen School’s method has 
also been criticised by scholars, particularly in regards to the language of threat. 
For instance, Matt McDonald highlights that the nature of the speech act (which 
embodies a securitising move) is too narrowly defined by the designation of 
threat.68 Holger Stritzel argues that basing analysis on an existential threat alone 
does not take into account how security practices can relate to threats which are 
not explicitly a case of survival.69 This is particularly the case in energy security 
and climate change debates. 
 
An example of an immediate energy security threat that invoked a strong policy 
response is the Arab Oil Crisis of 1973/74, and 1979, in which Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) reduced oil supplies to particular countries through 
embargo action.70 The International Energy Agency was established to respond to 
these disruptions, and coordinate member states’ energy policy to mitigate the 
effects of another oil disruption to their economies. New Zealand is one of these 
member states. This is a security argument that is not based on existential threat 
alone, but formed on the economic significance of the oil crisis and international 
mobilisations of states. The New Zealand Energy Strategy of 2011 referenced 
New Zealand’s continued fulfilment of its International Energy Agency 
obligations that hedge against another serious international oil supply 
disruption.71 It is clear that the referent object is the New Zealand economy 
which is vulnerable not only to price increases but also ‘external disruptions to 
                                                          
67 Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond." p. 360 
68 Matt McDonald, "Securitisation and the Construction of Security," European Journal of 
International Relations 14, no. 563 (2008). p. 563 
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71 Ministry of Economic Development, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing 
Our Energy Potential." p. 13 
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oil supply.’ 72  This warrants the government to allocate funds to continue 
purchasing oil stocks, and have a national emergency response strategy in place 
in case of another oil disruption. The effects of oil disruptions were clear enough 
for states to mobilise and form the International Energy Agency, and agree on 
collective policy to hedge against any future risk.  
 
A security argument is often applied to energy and climate change issues using 
the language of threat, but the threat is not necessarily exceptional or an explicit 
case of immediate survival. For instance, Barry Barton argues that energy 
security issues can vary by the nature of the threat where short­term natural 
disasters are one form of threat to security, as are longer­term droughts and 
changes in climate.73 Particularly in the latter case, the threat is not an explicit 
case of immediate survival.  Nevertheless as in the case of climate change, long­
term threats can be couched in a security argument. The most explicit example of 
a securitising move made by an actor in the climate change debate is the rhetoric 
of the President of the Republic of Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed. In September 
2009 he stated that ‘For the Maldives, climate change is no vague or distant 
irritation but a clear and present danger to our survival […] we need emergency 
action all around the world to curb emissions.’ 74  This is a highly political 
invocation of a security argument as it emphasises threat, survival and the 
urgency for the issue to be addressed. This does not necessarily mean that action 
takes place: the emergency mobilisation or all states to address climate change 
has simply not occurred. So what makes a security argument successful? What 
other results can these arguments, applied to energy and climate change issues, 
have in politics? 
 
 
                                                          
72 ———, "New Zealand Energy Strategy: Developing Our Energy Potential and the New Zealand 
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Securitising moves: who, how and where? 
 
Clearly securitising moves take place in different contexts, by different actors and 
will have different results. In his State of the Union address in January, 2007, 
President George W. Bush stated that it was in the interest of the U.S. to diversify 
its oil supply: ‘[f]or too long our Nation has been dependent on foreign oil.  And 
this dependence leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists ­ 
who could cause huge disruptions of oil shipments ... raise the price of oil ... and 
do great harm to our economy.’75 The reference to hostile regimes in the U.S. 
debate on energy dependency has strong militant connotations, while the 
examples of climate change threats to energy security are more environmental or 
economic. Comparatively, Barry Barton states that in New Zealand there is not 
the same need to couch issues of oil dependency in terms of national security.76 
Or, as Andrew Holland argues that the perception of oil dependence as a security 
risk is very different between Europe and the U.S.; Europeans have not felt the 
price spikes as keenly, due to their higher taxes and greater efficiency.77 
 
Buzan et al.’s securitisation analysis in this respect, includes not only political 
and military sectoral understandings of security, but also environmental, 
economic and societal. The sectors provide a broader range of lenses though 
which different issues are viewed by actors, and bring to light exactly how New 
Zealand actors define security. 78  While the sectors are viewed as analytical 
devices, Buzan et al. state that ‘sectors exist not only in a theoretician’s head but 
also in policy heads, where the concept of security itself is the integrating force,’ 
and that ‘actors think about economics, politics, and other areas but judge their 
main security problems across the board.’79  Analysing the lens through which an 
issue is politicised and securitised, or whether the same issue appears across a 
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number of sectors, can give an indication of how a security concept is debated or 
constructed. It can also explain how and why politicians in New Zealand may 
refer to energy security differently, through a subjective process of judging where 
the issue sits in their broader political agenda.   
 
The success of securitising moves, relative to the sector analysis, can also indicate 
what existing narratives of security have the greatest political appeal. Why for 
instance, would Labour MP David Parker argue that energy security is 
paramount, and renewables have a ‘vital role to play’ in this. Or why would the 
Hon Gerry Brownlee, as energy spokesperson prior to the November 2008 
election, argue that the National party would have an ‘unrelenting focus on 
security of supply’? Securitisation Theory allows for consideration of these 
factors in the idea of resonating conditions. It is these conditions that make a 
securitising move successful, or unsuccessful, in convincing an audience that an 
issue should be addressed. They include consideration of how well an issue 
(presented using the language of threat) fits with existing perceptions of security, 
the status of the actor presenting the threat, and features of threat that can 
facilitate or impede securitisation. 80  This includes contextual dynamics, 
developments and institutional contexts that enable ‘securitising moves’ to 
become successful.81  
 
The resonating conditions can account for aspects of New Zealand that influence 
the way energy security risks are viewed and constructed. This can elaborate on 
why politicians or bureaucrats in New Zealand may couch energy security in 
certain ways, dependent on the existing discourse or policy approaches to 
security or energy. These could include physical characteristics of geological 
isolation; or idiosyncratic energy concerns such as the effects of drought on 
hydro damns, or political factors such as the free­market principles. 
Securitisation Theory also accounts for the international context that can equally 
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influence the dynamics of energy security at the national level. New Zealand is 
largely self­sufficient in energy except for imported oil. This is unlike the 
European Union, who, for example, is reliant on the pipeline from Russia to 
provide its gas supply.82 The international context includes the imperatives of 
economic growth and consumption of fossil fuels in the Asia­Pacific region, 
climate change, high and volatile oil prices, uncertainty in the ability of energy 
markets to meet increasing demand, and indeed, the global economic recession.  
 
Depending on resonating conditions securitising moves can result in a 
politicisation of an energy issue or a securitisation. First, according to Buzan et al. 
‘politicisation means to make an issue appear open, a matter of choice, something 
that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility […]’ This is in 
contrast to a securitisation which is to present an issue as urgent and existential, 
and ‘so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics, 
but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.’83 This is 
the case particularly on the international level, although not always on the 
domestic one.84 Second, securitisation can be viewed as a more extreme version 
of a politicisation.85 In this sense a politicisation can move ‘up the scale’ to a 
securitisation, given the right circumstances.86 Yet the relationship between a 
securitising move and its result is not always clear­cut. 87 As Buzan et al. admit, it 
is less clear whether a securitising move ‘points to specific emergency measures 
and a violation of normal politics or established rules.’88 
 
Shocking and immediate events in particular, can facilitate the clear securitisation 
of an issue. In terms of energy security this was the case in 1973/74 Arab Oil 
Crisis. Shock is a contributing factor in providing impetus for the construction of 
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87 Gareth M Winrow, "Energy Security in the Broader Mediterranean," European Security 17, no. 1 
(March 2008). p. 163 
88 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 178 
34 
 
new security narratives. A current example is the 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Centre. Bryan Mabee, in his article Re­imagining the Borders of U.S. Security 
after 9/11: Securitisation, Risk, and the Creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, states that ‘[w]hen external threat is linked to monumental (and often 
catastrophic) events, it can lead to historical openings for the rearticulating of 
security.’89 The formation of the Homeland Security Department in the U.S. was a 
direct institutional response to the 9/11 events and evident of a securitisation in 
response to terrorism. Disasters can also be embedded in the social psyche as a 
security issue, dealt with at the time through extraordinary measures and policy 
that prevail well after the disaster has passed. An event like Chernobyl for 
instance, can dictate subsequent action to make sure such an event would never 
occur again.90  
 
Politicisations however, are particularly relevant to the international debate on 
energy security. Determining the nature of energy security risks in regards to 
climate change, is difficult because the risks are long­term and not immediately 
apparent.  It is also a subjective process, and leads to contestation in policy­
formation. When integrating climate risks with those of energy security, the 
debate naturally broadens and becomes more complex. The Intergovernmental 
Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) has provided the science behind the potential 
effects of climate change, such as the accelerated pace of natural disasters, 
however, how these are translated into policy are ‘[…] value judgements 
determined through socio­political processes, taking into account considerations 
such as development, equity, and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and 
risk.’91 The IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 states, ‘[t]he energy world is facing 
unprecedented uncertainty […]’92 Thus the energy security and climate change 
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nexus has sparked contentious debate on risk and a flurry of rhetoric. The 
Copenhagen School argues that politicisations are often present in a situation 
where there is uncertainty over the rules of the game and the nature of threat.93 
Politicisations of energy security therefore tend to have a political purpose.  
 
The tactical appeal of security arguments 
 
When there is contentious debate on energy security and climate change risks, 
security arguments have tactical appeal. This is particularly the case for energy 
issues in which threats are long­term and not immediately apparent. The 
language of threat invokes a sense of urgency, of action, and of how it prioritises 
issues.94 This is why issues like climate change, or long­term energy security risks 
of oil dependency, may be politicised by politicians to inject a sense of urgency to 
address these issues. Oli Brown and Robert McLeman argue that ‘Climate change 
was seen by security organisations as an issue lurking somewhere over the 
horizon, to be studied and monitored.’95 Brown, of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) stated that raising climate change on the back of 
national security concerns is politically motivated to inject a greater sense of 
urgency to boost global efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. He argues that this is 
because the people who talk about security issues are prime ministers and 
presidents, and ‘[t]alking about climate change in security terms raises it to the 
realm of high politics.’96 There has been faltering state action on climate change 
and robust debate over the nature and degree of threat it presents. Not to 
mention the difficult negotiations towards the who and how of reducing global 
greenhouse gas emissions. These environmental lobbies often result in 
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politicisations as, Buzan et al. state that ‘In terms of politicising causes, much is 
happening, but most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitisation.’97 This 
raises the question of whether security arguments have been used in the energy 
debate in New Zealand, in terms of energy security or climate change.   
 
Rhetorical politicisations of energy security, with tactical intentions, can have a 
variety of forms.  An example is the politicisation of oil and gas by Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez prior to the Russian­Ukraine gas dispute of 2006. A 
substantial amount of literature on energy security concerns from the EU 
emerged that was set against the backdrop of the gas dispute.98 According to E. 
Harks, President Chavez warned of an oil export disruption to the U.S. while 
‘charming offensives towards China and the threat of euro­denominated oil 
exports.’ 99  This situation coupled with the break­down of relations between 
Russia and Ukraine, skyrocketed the ‘Eastern European energy scenario and 
problems associated with natural gas to the top of the political agenda of 
European governments.’100 Thus the European Commission responded with an 
energy strategy: “Green Paper: A European Strategy for sustainable, competitive 
and secure energy.” 101  Effectively, energy security was politicised and 
characterised by two competing energy policy responses. A. Makarychev argues 
that Russia politicised energy relations with concepts of ‘energy sovereignty’ and 
‘energy superpower’ while the European Union did it by broadening the 
possibilities for normalising energy markets on the basis of the European 
economic model.102 Thus Securitisation Theory can also help understand how 
politicisations manifest in different energy policy responses.  
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The ways in which energy security is interpreted and rhetorically politicised can 
have real effects in politics as well as energy markets. First, how governments 
politicise energy security risks is particularly important to understand as it can 
have destabilising effects on energy relations. Energy markets are highly 
politicised arenas, especially when energy concerns are politicised as national 
security concerns. As Vlado Vivoda argues ‘Energy security is a vital national 
security concern for all states and energy nationalism dominate the behaviour of 
nation­states in Asia.’103 For instance, an article entitled China or the United 
States: which threatens energy security?, addresses how China’s role in the 
changing global energy market – where the price of oil is at records highs ­ has 
lead to debate centred on the ‘China energy threat’. In particular the article states 
that ‘[t]he ‘China energy threat’ reflects the disputes between China and America 
over energy security, the majority of which are attributable to geopolitical 
clashes,’ and that ‘[t]he politicisation of oil has already exerted considerable effect 
on the relationship between China and America over issues like Sudan […]’104 
Second, governments have the difficult role of managing risks to energy security 
that can stem from international or domestic energy markets. Thus a 
politicisation of energy security can also highlight imperfections in these markets. 
Harris and Naughten state, in ‘[…] in economic terms, security problems imply 
what economists refer to as market failures or market imperfections.’105  These 
market imperfections can include new risks that global energy resources will be 
constrained by rising demand and low supply margins, or the externalities of the 
process of consuming these resources on a warming climate. Thus politicisations 
of energy security risks from the energy market especially by governments, 
implies that an energy policy response is needed.  
 
In the United States, tactical politicisations of energy security have manifested in 
institutional restructuring to address new risks in energy policy. First, energy 
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security can be politicised within domestic politics, and made part of the 
institutional framework for dealing with energy concerns. The U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton created the International Energy Affairs at the State 
Department, to demonstrate the importance of energy security to U.S. Foreign 
Policy.106  To what extent has a similar move been made in New Zealand? Was 
David Parker’s appointment to both Minister of Energy and Minister Responsible 
for Climate Change Issues in 2005 a strategic move to politicise energy security? 
President Barack Obama’s sentiment reinforces the institutional move made by 
Hillary Clinton, most recently in regards to how unrest in the Middle­East (with 
implicit reference to Libya, as well as the tsunami and nuclear disaster in Japan) 
connects to ‘the cost and security of our energy.’107 And in particular, how ‘the 
situation in the Middle East implicates our energy security.’108 Has New Zealand 
couched these new energy concerns in terms of energy security? If not, why not? 
Securitisation Theory provides the basis to find answers to these questions by 
first, pinpointing where security arguments have been used. Second, 
Securitisation Theory can also highlight different features of a politicisation of 
energy security (other than just a security argument), as seen in the example of 
Clinton’s creation of the International Energy Affairs.  
 
Securitisation Theory can show the tactical features of an actor’s presentation of 
energy security risks in energy politics. First, Securitisation Theory highlights the 
different lenses through which an energy risk can be framed. Second, the theory 
examines the success of the politicisation in relation to existing risk perceptions 
and institutions. Thus where politicisations of energy security are tactical moves 
can be highlighted: to support new energy policy initiatives to address climate 
change by framing energy security risks in both economic, military and 
environmental terms. The U.S. for instance, may feel primarily threatened by 
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military matters and therefore define security in military terms,109 which affects 
how different issues that arise are assimilated into the country’s politics. 
President Obama used similar language, in relation to hostile regimes, and 
terrorism ­ evidently a military concern ­ but added the effects of climate change 
(an environmental issue) in the same way. He highlighted the dire need for the 
U.S. to reduce its oil dependency and gave it urgency by stating that ‘America 
will not be held hostage to dwindling resources, hostile regimes and a warming 
planet […]’ 110  The issue of oil dependency and its associated threats, were 
presented by President Barack Obama not only with militant connotations but 
also with vast environmental and societal consequences. Thus Securitisation 
Theory can not only show where politicisations of risks are tactical, but also 
highlight features that influence how issues are presented in politics.  
 
Whether New Zealand’s political leaders have politicised energy security risks 
can be determined using Securitisation Theory. Analysis of this kind can also 
reveal features of New Zealand’s institutional structure for dealing with energy 
concerns. Furthermore, it can reveal the extent to which energy security has been 
politicised in attempt to change existing perceptions or push through new policy. 
Essentially President Obama’s politicisation of threats associated to oil 
dependency is what Holger Stritzel terms an ‘act of translation,’ where a new 
threat or issue is worked into the existing discourse. The better the resonance of 
this new threat with the old security framework, and the better the positional 
power of the actor, Stritzel argues, ‘the easier it is for them to establish their 
preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective.’ 111 
President Obama appeals directly to military narratives that strike a particular 
chord, then assimilates this more powerful narrative of terrorism with a less 
powerful one: the need to reduce oil dependency. This is also associated to the 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change. Whether 
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President Obama is successful in convincing others that all of these threats are 
urgent enough to address oil dependency equally suggests something of the 
nature of security in the U.S.: namely that the transition of the U.S. economy to 
clean energy, and low­carbon, faces strong debate and obstacles.112 Buzan et al. 
state for instance, that one of the difficulties of securitising environmental issues 
is that these new threats ‘find themselves operating in a political context 
dominated by security institutions designed for other types of threats.’ 113 
Institutional arrangements and resonating conditions have their role to play, and 
therefore can impede or facilitate the securitisation of new threats. In sum, New 
Zealand’s institutional structures that address energy security and perceptions of 
risk can be more thoroughly understood using Securitisation Theory.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Securitisation Theory can examine the extent to which energy security is political 
in New Zealand. In other words, Securitisation Theory can examine how and 
why energy security has been framed in politics or as something to be addressed 
by government. First, Securitisation Theory identifies how an issue is presented 
by an actor in order to encourage action to address the issue within or above 
politics. The framing of energy security concerns can be unpacked using the idea 
that issues can be viewed through otherwise conflicting lenses. Environmental 
and economic lenses will be particularly relevant to the analysis of energy 
security. Second, Securitisation Theory unpacks the resonating conditions and 
pressures that influence how energy security risks are politicised. This can also 
help evaluate the reasons for the success of these risks being addressed in debate 
and policy. Analysis will also reveal features of the New Zealand’s institutional 
structures for addressing energy security concerns, as well as perceptions of risk 
in the domestic policy environment that are shaping energy policy. This is 
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important to understand because as much as energy security can be a technical 
and administrative problem for actors in the energy market, it can also be a 
highly political and contested one in domestic and international politics. New 
Zealand, like other governments, face complex questions for policy in regards to 
energy, as energy is at the centre of both climate change and economic growth. 
Fundamentals of the global energy market are changing particularly in regards to 
oil which is in greater demand and more highly priced than previous years. The 
extent to which new threats to energy security are also presented in New Zealand 
energy politics will reveal much about its approach to the complexity of energy 
issues. 
 
Throughout the remainder of the discussion, this thesis will apply the 
Copenhagen School’s framework of analysis to key energy policy documents, 
reports, discussions and, speeches and media releases by relevant politicians and 
bureaucrats, news articles in the New Zealand media, as well as broader political 
dialogue on energy policy between government and key stakeholders. Energy 
security has been politicised in a variety of ways. In some instances, particularly 
the United States, politicisation has a role in the political debate to deal with 
climate change. Specifically, to what extent may this have played out in New 
Zealand energy politics? Governments face both international and domestic 
pressures when it comes to energy politics, and energy security. For instance on 
the domestic front, John Deutch argues that ‘[t]he public understandably wants 
cheap and dependable energy that permits an improved lifestyle and neither 
harms the environment nor depends on foreign sources. Simultaneously 
satisfying all these conditions is difficult, if not impossible […]’114 Then on the 
international front Anthony Froggatt and Michael A. Levi state that concerns for 
climate change and energy security ‘are leading to greater government 
intervention in the energy sector than has existed since the start of energy market 
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liberalisation several decades ago.’ 115  In this respect, the way governments 
interpret and present energy security in their domestic and international affairs 
can shed light on the way they intend to manage these different pressures, 
particularly risks and insecurities that stem from the energy market or the 
challenges of climate change. New Zealand is no exception to these challenges. 
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Chapter Three 
The Clark Labour Government, Energy Security and 
Climate Change 
 
The Clark Labour Government used a strategy of politicisation to bring energy 
security issues onto the political agenda. This helped to forge an integrated, 
whole­of­government approach to climate change policy.  This chapter will use 
Securitisation Theory to explain how energy security was politicised and the role 
it played in the policy­making process. It will argue that the Clark Government 
used particular energy security rhetoric to legitimise its robust policy response to 
climate change. First, energy security was identified as a challenge alongside 
climate change that required strong government leadership and policy action. It 
was used as an umbrella term for risks to New Zealand’s energy system. In 
particular, new risks from the international and domestic energy markets were 
given emphasis. These energy security risks were presented through both 
environmental and economic lenses and, therefore, demonstrated the 
Government’s efforts to synthesise energy concerns in policy response. The Clark 
Government politicised energy security in this way consistently between relevant 
government departments dealing with climate change and energy policy. Thus a 
strategy of politicisation is clear: energy security risks were identified that 
required a policy­response. This response would be through government 
leadership in the energy sector to develop robust climate change policy. 
 
The chapter is in four parts. The first section analyses the use of energy security 
in the major document on energy policy in New Zealand: the New Zealand 
Energy Strategy 2007. The second section will extend analysis to other policy 
documents, speeches and media releases during the Labour Government. The 
way government departments, including the Ministry of Economic Development 
and the Ministry for the Environment, refer to energy security will be critically 
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examined. A security argument was used to highlight the long­term risks of 
energy security in support of strong climate change policy. The third section will 
show the extent to which energy security risks were politicised, drawing also on 
the documents and mandates of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. The fourth section shows how energy security was 
integral to the Labour Government’s international climate change agenda. 
Energy security was politicised as a tactical move by Labour to support its other 
objective: to address international climate change in domestic policy through the 
promotion of sustainability and economic transformation.   
 
The New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050: powering our 
future 
Energy security in the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) under the 
Labour Government was politicised alongside climate change as a key challenge 
for energy policy. This was articulated in the New Zealand Energy Strategy 
(NZES), released in October 2007.116 The MED under the Labour Government 
had a clear strategic objective to respond to climate change. The Minister of 
Energy, David Parker, stated in the Foreword of the NZES 2007 that ‘[t]he New 
Zealand Energy Strategy sets the strategic direction for the energy sector to 
contribute to New Zealand’s future prosperity and sustainability.’ 117  The 
Government’s primary concerns were to promote economic transformation by 
formulating New Zealand’s response to climate change. 118  According to the 
NZES 2007 the quest for sustainability ‘has taken on a new urgency because of 
the scale of the environmental challenges the world faces.’119 First, the NZES of 
2007 would respond to this urgency on the basis of the Clark Government’s 
objectives: ‘provide clear direction on the future of New Zealand’s energy 
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system,’120 defined by the aspiration for ‘New Zealand to be carbon neutral over 
time.’121  Two key aspects of this framework affect the concept of energy security: 
the apparent link to the urgent issue of climate change and the concern for the 
future of New Zealand’s energy system in relation to the goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
During the NZES 2007 the Clark Government politicised energy security as a 
challenge in tandem with climate change, with a clear ambition to provide 
leadership in the energy sector in order to address these challenges. To restate, if 
an issue is politicised it is part of public policy and requires government decision, 
resources or governance.122 Energy security and climate change are at the core of 
the strategy and under this umbrella ‘[t]he New Zealand Energy Strategy 
specifically responds to the challenges of providing enough energy to meet the 
needs of a growing economy, maintaining security of supply and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.’123  The Minister for Energy David Parker stated that, 
‘the strategy will ensure the right conditions for capital investment in coming 
years and provide leadership on energy security and climate change.’124 The 
importance placed on the Government’s leadership on both challenges suggests 
indeed that governance, resources and strong decision­making are needed to 
deal with these challenges.  
 
Risk perceptions and climate change policy 
 
The NZES 2007 applied a security argument to its climate change policy by 
highlighting energy security risks. First, energy security risks in the international 
energy market were discussed. In the section 2.1 Energy Security, it states that 
‘the pressure on global energy resources is expected to increase strongly [...] oil 
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markets may come under pressure due to supply constraints within the next five 
years.’125 Second, it argues that these consumption patterns mean that, ‘within a 
decade, the capacity to increase oil production will be concentrated to just a few 
predominantly OPEC countries.’ Following, that as the IEA has reported, ‘the 
ability and willingness of major oil and gas producers to step up investment in 
order to meet rising global demand are particularly uncertain.’126 
 
This argument strikes a chord with the historic fear of oil supply disruptions in 
the 1973/74 Arab Oil Crisis, when the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) reduced oil supplies to particular countries through embargo 
action. 127  Professor Ralph Sims suggests these historic energy security fears 
remain in politicians’ minds.128 In the NZES 2007 these fears broaden to new risks 
in the uncertainty of the market to maintain supply to meet the international 
rising demand for energy. New Zealand’s reliance on this market is exposed, 
insofar as the country relies on ‘imported oil for around half of [its] energy needs, 
and must be prepared to respond to supply disruptions [...]’129 and that the 
Government has buffered against this risk by increasing oil reserves to meet its 
IEA obligations. Invoking uncertainty in this market brings to mind not only the 
fears of a repeat of political exploitation of oil by OPEC, but also questions of 
security of supply in the efficient but insecure, economic dependence of a nation 
on outside sources of energy supply.130  
 
In the NZES 2007, these risks of the international market support the argument 
for a domestic policy response to climate change. The NZES 2007 argues that 
New Zealand, the referent object, will be affected by an increasing import bill 
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relative to increasing oil prices which is ‘all the more reason to lessen our 
dependence on imported oil.’131 Furthermore in section 4.6.2 Transport, it states 
that ‘[i]t is in New Zealand’s wider interests to reduce our transport emissions 
and our dependence on imported oil.’132  Again this is essentially a security 
argument, as Harris and Naughten state, ‘[…] in economic terms, security 
problems imply what economists refer to as market failures or market 
imperfections.’ 133  New Zealand can simultaneously hedge against oil price 
uncertainty and disruptions (market imperfections) and address climate change 
through emissions reductions in the transportation sector. 134  Energy security 
embodies a heightened awareness of new risks and uncertainty in the energy 
market, and in this respect is presented in a way that supports the Clark 
Government’s political agenda to form more robust climate change policy. 
 
This emphasis on New Zealand’s exposure to international energy security risks 
is integrated with a presentation of risks in the domestic market. Again, by 
highlighting these risks the NZES 2007 is implying that governance of the energy 
sector is required in order to address them. The NZES 2007 proposed energy 
security measures include first, that this uncertainty can be addressed in an 
effective policy response.135 The section on Energy Security highlights how gas 
supplies can be ‘interrupted by international events’, and that simply using more 
gas without developing oil reserves is not enough, as prices will increase in the 
gas and electricity sector.136 In the section entitled Measures to Ensure Energy 
Security, it states that in terms of non­renewable resources an energy security 
measure is ‘[c]larifying the long­term role of gas (including LPG), oil and coal 
and other alternative energy sources in New Zealand’s energy mix,’ 137  and 
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‘[i]ncreasing energy efficiency and resonating demand­side response.’138 The use 
of non­renewable resources such as oil and coal, contribute to climate change. 
Clarifying their role and managing their consumption through energy efficiency 
are examples of climate change policy. Other measures include regulations in the 
market, the most important being ‘[a]n ongoing commitment to competitive 
markets and focused regulation to deliver the objectives of the NZES.’139 These 
examples all equate to emphasising the risks and threats to energy supply that in 
turn can be addressed through government initiatives in climate change policy.  
 
Energy security embodies risks in the domestic and international energy market, 
but in particular these are long­term risks. As Chapter Two highlights, security 
arguments have tactical appeal in the energy security and climate change debate 
when threats associated to both are not immediately apparent. In the NZES 2007, 
clarifying the role of different resources in the present hedges against perceived 
long­term risks of an uncertain future in the energy market. The NZES 2007 in 
this respect, the long­term scope of energy security policy with the long­term 
scope of climate change policy. This is evident in the policy focus on renewable 
resources. In section 4.6.1 Electricity, the NZES 2007 states that ‘it is in New 
Zealand’s longer­term economic and environmental interests to meet increases in 
demand through an economic mix of renewable energy sources that will meet 
our security objectives.’ 140  Here, economic and environmental concerns are 
synthesised with national interest and energy security, ultimately to argue the 
benefits of relying on renewable energy for future energy sources. These 
objectives are centred in the development of renewable resources and target of 90 
percent renewable electricity generation by 2050.141  
 
The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) presented the same line of argument for 
renewable energy policy: highlighting the long­term risks to energy security if 
                                                          
138 Ibid. p. 19 
139 Ibid. p. 19 
140 Ibid. p. 22 
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the Government does not provide clear leadership on climate change policy. The 
Clark Government proposed a National Policy Statement in support of the NZES 
2007. The NPS aimed to encourage all new developments in electricity generation 
to be from renewable resources only.142 This was to be implemented through an 
amendment to the Resource Management Act. The MfE argued that the NPS 
would lead to greater certainty in the market for renewable energy, and that this 
would increase security and resilience of electricity supply.143 Or in other words, 
renewable energy would increase New Zealand’s energy security. Second, the 
MfE highlighted risks to energy security if the government did not take this 
legislative measure. This again, is bolstered by the argument that there is market 
uncertainty due to a lack of government leadership. In a report on the reasons for 
implementing the NPS, the MfE stated that,  
 
[..] the proposed NPS identified that market uncertainty created by 
lack of clear government direction on the benefits of renewable 
electricity generation introduces a risk that generators will be 
unable to develop sufficient capacity to meet the government’s 
renewable electricity targets as expressed in the New Zealand 
energy strategy.144  
 
The Clark Government thus politicised long­term energy security risks in order 
to bring the future of New Zealand’s energy sector to the focus of policy. Here, 
energy security risks are not immediate or a case of survival, but they do have 
tactical appeal to support climate change initiatives. The presentation of energy 
security was clearly in support of the NPS and the NZES 2007.  Energy security 
embodied future risks and uncertainties of the energy market. These risks were 
considered important enough to deem a strong policy response in the present by 
                                                          
142 Ministry for the Environment, "Archived Publication: Renewable Energy Solutions Combat 
Climate Change," mfe.govt.nz, 
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the Clark Government. Energy security in this respect, is a politicised issue that 
supports the need for governance of the energy sector, not just for energy 
security’s sake, but also for New Zealand’s policy response to climate change.  
 
The politicisation of energy security 
 
The extent of this politicisation was evident in the consistency of presentation 
and perceptions of energy security between relevant government departments 
and agencies. This also suggests that the Clark Government’s energy security and 
climate change agenda were taking on a strong institutional form. This is evident 
in the New Zealand Transport Strategy released in 2008 prior to the election of 
the Key National Government. The New Zealand Transport Agency is 
responsible for helping ‘New Zealanders travel reliably and safely and to grow 
the country’s economy by investing in moving people and freight,’ as well as 
delivering national transport networks and support local networks, and making 
public transport and freight networks more effective.145 Prior to the 2008 election 
the Ministry of Transport outlined a strategic approach to research on the basis 
that ‘New Zealand’s transport sector has an important part to play in 
contributing to the government’s goal of economic transformation and energy 
conservation for New Zealand [...]’146 This drew on key challenges identified by 
the NZES 2007, energy security and climate change, and emphasised even more 
so the threats oil dependency posed to the New Zealand economy. The 
presentation of these concerns in strategic documents also gives a clear indication 
that the issues are deemed to be important enough to be integrated into the 
strategic focus of the Ministry of Transport.  
 
The language of risk and vulnerability was used in relation to New Zealand’s 
dependency on the international energy market. The NZTS states that ‘supplies 
                                                          
145 New Zealand Transport Agency, "About Us," nzta.govt.nz, 
http://www.nzta.govt.nz/about/index.html. 
146 ———, "NZ Transport Agency's Approach to Research 2009­12," (Wellington October 2008). p. 
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of conventional (cheap) oil are finite, and global demand is growing due to 
rapidly increasing consumption in developing countries like China and India.’147 
This is coupled with recognition of the interconnected nature of the New Zealand 
economy and international markets, insofar as New Zealand’s economic future as 
a trading nation is closely linked to the international economy.148 Hence New 
Zealand is highly dependent on fossil fuels for transport, and that the ‘[...] nation 
is vulnerable to potential fuel supply disruptions and future cost increases.’149 The 
referent object here is the ‘nation,’ as well as the economy, where it states that ‘[i]f 
oil shortages or high costs occur before alternatives can be found, they would 
have an adverse impact on the New Zealand economy.’150  The use of the nation 
compared to the economy implies not only macro­level success of the country but 
also the security of communities and individuals. This could well be the case 
considering that the NZTS also highlights the relationship between high oil costs 
and increasing price of commodities, the cost of public transport, implications for 
tourism, business, and price of goods that need to be transported as well as the 
everyday New Zealander ‘getting around.’ It also states that ‘[t]hose on low 
incomes are particularly vulnerable.’ 151  The NZTS presents oil dependency 
through an economic lens, specifically in regards to the threat of the rising price 
of oil to the economy that is linked also to individuals’ standard of living. 
 
The NZTS also presented these economic risks of oil dependency through an 
environmental lens of concern for climate change. First, the NZTS argued that 
economic performance and growth will likely result in higher transport demand 
in the future, and ‘Such growth in demand will place significant burdens on the 
transport network and could harm economic competitiveness as a result of 
congestion [which] may adversely affect the social and environmental wellbeing 
                                                          
147 Ministry of Transport, "The New Zealand Transport Strategy," ed. Ministry of Transport 
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of New Zealanders [...]’152 This policy is driven by the need to reduce emissions 
from transport to meet New Zealand’s climate change obligations. 153 
Consequently, these risks can be mitigated through New Zealand’s ‘potential to 
generate renewable electricity and, in future, to produce sustainable bio­fuels.’154 
Energy security is clearly used in the argument to transition to other sources of 
fuel that can align with climate change concerns, and benefit energy security. Or 
that ‘the challenge for New Zealand is to decrease energy use in the transport 
sector, while moving to sources of energy that are not based on fossil fuels, and 
are less vulnerable to changing international prices and availability.’155Again this 
is in tune to the NZES 2007 presentation of risks. The NZTS uses the same 
language to emphasise the need to address these challenges in a way that can 
also synthesise with climate change concerns.  
 
The synthesis of energy security risks with climate change policy was also 
evident in the Ministry for the Environment. MfE is the lead department on 
international climate change and domestic environmental issues and governance. 
The Ministry states that it ‘advises the Government on all matters related to the 
environment and is one of its major advisers on the sustainable development of 
New Zealand,’ furthermore that their ‘advice includes both international and 
domestic matters related to the environment and climate change’ as well as 
advice on effective environmental governance. 156  Under the Labour­led 
Government the MfE argued that domestic energy security is improved through 
reducing oil imports and developing domestic renewable resources, both linked 
also to reducing emissions to ‘improve our environment.’157 Energy security risks 
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were clearly included in the MfE’s ambit, and framed in a way to support climate 
change initiatives in energy policy.  
 
Increased energy security was presented as a benefit of the Government’s 
implementation of a number of policies and measures to reduce emissions and 
prepare for climate change, among them, ‘improving the fuel efficiency of 
vehicles, increasing the standards for insulation in buildings, and encouraging 
renewable energy.’ 158 The concept of energy security was characterised by a 
common recognition, by the Ministry for the Environment, the Ministry of 
Economic Development and the New Zealand Transport Agency, of the risk of 
oil import dependency and the benefit of the renewable energy focus on 
increasing domestic supply. Domestic energy security was again presented as a 
response to international uncertainties in the oil market and a benefit from 
climate change policy. The concept therefore, had a strong international 
dimension, which was politicised and integrated into domestic strategy. 
 
Energy security and New Zealand’s international climate 
change agenda 
 
The Clark Government’s political agenda on climate change policy also had a 
strong international dimension, which informed how it perceived energy 
security’s strategic role in promoting sustainable economic development both at 
home and abroad.  The Clark Government decided that it wanted to position 
New Zealand at the forefront of climate change policy. According to the Ministry 
for the Environment’s Statement of Intent 2007 – 2010 (SOI 2007 – 2010), New 
Zealand’s policy around sustainability would inform the country’s interactions at 
the international level, among them on energy and climate change, and was 
‘designed to position New Zealand as an innovative and interlinked nation in a 
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future (low carbon) world.’159  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (MFAT) 
Statements of Intent under the Labour Government clearly outlined 
environmental sustainability as a key priority for New Zealand. For instance, 
MFAT’s SOI 2007 – 2010 refers to the way in which climate change brings about 
concerns for sustainable resource and development strategies, the environment 
and energy security.160 
 
MFAT also politicised energy security as an international issue integrated with 
other concerns for economic growth and climate change. First, the SOI 2007­2010 
released under Labour refers to energy security in tandem with competition for 
natural resources, where ‘[t]he integration of worldwide markets for labour, 
goods, services, capital, and technology is quickening, with increasing 
competition for natural resources and energy security.’161 Energy security here is 
related to the guarantee of access to resources, and more broadly, to the 
guarantee of supply to meet demand. This is not surprising, because at the time 
international literature tended to focus on two concerns that were becoming 
increasingly acute in the Asia­Pacific, namely, the increasing oil import 
dependency from fewer supplier countries, mostly concentrated in the Middle­
East, and the region’s economic dependency on petroleum.162  
 
The SOI 2007­2010 also politicised energy security as both an economic and 
environmental concern, and linked it to climate change. It states that ‘[t]he issue 
of climate change brings together many concerns about the environment, energy 
security, and sustainable resource and development strategies,’ and energy 
security naturally is a key feature because ‘responses to climate change are likely 
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to sit within a broader context of promoting sustainable practices across 
economies, including [...] energy [...]’163 In turn, strategically, the focus for New 
Zealand’s engagement in the international environment agenda was to promote 
New Zealand’s domestic values and interests, where ‘[a]n increasingly important 
dimension in our engagement is around issues of environmental 
sustainability.’164 Energy security is recognised as a key feature on the operating 
landscape, and concerns for energy security were presented as integral with 
dialogue on climate change.   
 
For MFAT, promoting the energy security and climate change agenda was 
evident in dialogue on economic development in the Pacific region. New 
Zealand’s involvement with the United States in the International Partnership for 
Energy Development in Island Nations (EDIN) aimed to ‘[...] increase energy 
security in island nations by promoting clean energy technologies.’ 165 In 2006, at 
the 37th Meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (which MFAT participated in), it 
was reported that ‘Leaders recognised the detrimental impact on people and 
countries in the region of increased oil prices particularly in small island 
economies,’ and moreover that ‘[t]hey affirmed the importance of assured long­
term energy security to the future prosperity of the region.’166 Not only are price 
concerns being articulated here, but clearly the long­term features of energy 
security were also negotiated. Finally, according to the report, the leaders 
‘welcomed proposals to explore the possibilities for bulk petroleum purchasing 
and for exploitation of renewable energy resources.’167  
 
The same approach was taken on at the Asia­Pacific level as well. For instance, in 
the East Asia Summit (EAS) New Zealand made progress in contributing to ‘new 
streams of work on environment and education, and on­going work on energy 
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security and financial cooperation [...]’ 168 This is also referenced by MFAT today, 
where mention of energy security in EAS is seen as another ‘avenue to work with 
our neighbours.’169 Another regional body mentioned is APEC, in which progress 
was described as ‘secur[ing] Leader’s Declaration on Climate Change and Energy 
Security.’170 Engaging with energy security and promoting on­going work for it 
to be achieved in light of environmental and climate change considerations, was 
evidently regarded as a positive in New Zealand foreign policy.  
 
The foreign policy approach synthesises with the approach to energy security 
and climate change in the NZES 2007. This is evidence of how in many ways, the 
domestic and foreign policy agendas were in step. Interestingly the international 
concern for energy security in the NZES 2007, particularly the uncertainty in the 
oil market, played out in foreign policy through a military lens of security. At the 
time of the Clark Government, New Zealand was engaged in the conflict in 
Afghanistan; and, more broadly, the War on Terror was still fresh in the minds of 
key players in the international community. MFAT’s regard for the region shows 
reference to key characteristics of energy security issues of secure supply at 
affordable prices, as ‘[New Zealand shares] with many countries an interest in 
secure energy supplies at affordable prices. These interests give New Zealanders 
a direct stake in the stability of this turbulent region.171 Identified as an ‘Area of 
Concentration and Intervention’, the SOI 2007 highlighted that support for 
stabilisation, reconstruction and reconciliation effort in the Middle East was 
consistent with ‘New Zealand security interests and values.’ Furthermore, 
tensions in this region involve major international political and economic 
challenges that shape the ‘global environment in which New Zealand 
operates.’172 In sum, international energy security issues were not presented in 
                                                          
168 ———, "Annual Report 2007/08." p. 14 
169  ———, "Our Future with Asia," mfat.govt.co.nz, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media­and­
publications/Publications/Asia­White­Paper/0­asia­strategy.php. 
170 ———, "Annual Report 2007/08." p. 40 
171 ———, "Statement of Intent 2007­2010 Incorporating the Forecast Financial Statements for 
2007/08." p. 35 
172 Ibid. p. 35 
57 
 
isolation to New Zealand’s domestic interests, rather, they were clearly 
integrated with domestic policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Energy security risks were coherently presented across government departments 
and agencies under the Clark Government. A strategy of politicisation was used 
to bring particular energy security risks onto the political agenda, and argue that 
these required clear leadership of the Government in the energy sector. The 
domestic and international climate change agenda of the Clark Government 
shaped how energy security risks were presented and responded to in energy 
policy. As a politicised issue with climate change, energy security embodied 
long­term risks and uncertainty associated to the domestic and international 
energy markets. Additionally, it was used to demonstrate that these market 
externalities needed to be addressed. Energy security was also presented as a 
benefit of policy initiatives to address climate change, such as renewable energy 
policy and energy efficiency. The politicisation of energy security spread across 
government departments and agencies. This demonstrated the extent to which 
the Clark Government sought to institutionalise common perceptions of energy 
security risks. Second, these risks were not only framed in economic terms but 
also environmental ones that related the concept of energy security to climate 
change. Furthermore, the domestic approach to energy security and climate 
change was also integral to the Government’s foreign policy agenda to position 
New Zealand as an innovative nation in climate change policy. The task of the 
next chapter is to analyse how energy security is referred to under New 
Zealand’s present government. John Key’s National Government’s goal is 
economic growth, and the Ministry of Economic Development has identified the 
promotion of energy security as a way to help achieve this goal. The extent to 
which this agenda has shaped the presentation of energy security, and how 
different risks are prioritised in support of the Government’s interests, will be 
specifically highlighted for further analysis. 
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Chapter Four 
The Key National Government, Energy Security and 
Economic Growth 
 
The Key National Government marks a dramatic shift in how energy security is 
presented in energy policy since the Clark Government. The Key Government 
adopted the energy security label, but uses a strategy of politicisation to prioritise 
energy security policy measures that will contribute to economic growth. This 
chapter will use the Copenhagen School Theory of Securitisation to outline the 
key features of this move. First, energy security no longer embodies domestic and 
international risks. Instead, it embodies a heightened concern for security of 
supply. Second, it is presented as something that will contribute to economic 
prosperity and growth. Third, energy security is no longer included in the 
discourse of foreign policy documents and government departments, other than 
the Ministry of Economic Development’s current energy strategy. These are the 
key features of the Key Government’s distinct rhetorical politicisation of energy 
security to legitimise the prioritisation of petroleum and mineral resource 
exploitation: policy measures that will contribute to New Zealand’s economic 
prosperity as well as global energy security.  This is in distinct comparison to the 
Clark Government’s approach to energy security that was shaped by the 
prioritisation of renewable resources and robust climate change policy.  
 
This chapter, like the previous, is in four parts. The first section analyses the 
current NZES 2011 and outlines the Government’s broad objectives in energy 
policy that affect the way energy security will be addressed. The second section 
will embark on a detailed analysis of the present use of energy security in 
political discourse under the Key National Government, again policy documents, 
speeches and media releases, will be analysed. It will show how the predominant 
use of energy security in the Ministry of Economic Development’s energy 
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strategy is completely different to the Clark Government’s NZES 2007. The third 
section will argue that this is because the incumbent Government has a primary 
concern for security of supply. The fourth section will elaborate on the extent to 
which the Key Government has retracted the Clark Government’s politicisation 
of energy security and climate change. There are far fewer references to energy 
security made in work of the Ministry for the Environment, Ministry for 
Transport, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
In some instances, energy security is referenced by bureaucrats or politicians 
from these departments. However, it is no longer framed in terms of the 
language of threat, and more clearly in support of the National­led Government’s 
economic concerns.  
 
The New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: developing 
our energy potential 
 
The Key Government has adopted the energy security and climate change 
framework from the Clark Government. The economic benefits of resource 
development however, are the primary focus of the new energy strategy. In the 
Foreword of the New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 – 2021: developing our 
energy potential (NZES 2011) released in August 2011, acting Minister for Energy 
and Resources Hon Hekia Parata states that ‘Globally, there are two challenges: 
energy security and responding to climate change.’ 173  The response to these 
challenges is shaped by the key role the Government believes energy will play in 
the New Zealand economy.174 This role is clearly to develop New Zealand’s 
renewable, petroleum and mineral resources, as she states: ‘It is in New 
Zealand’s interest to use its portfolio of energy resources to maximise economic 
opportunities in a way that is environmentally­responsible.175 Four priority areas 
will be focused on to achieve this. These are diverse resource development, 
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environmental responsibility, achieving efficient use of energy, and promoting 
energy security and affordability. 176  This is based on the recognition that 
renewables will help address the challenges of energy security and climate 
change. Fossil fuels however, will also continue to play an important role in the 
energy mix, as ‘We cannot just turn off the tap in our journey to a lower carbon 
economy.’177  
 
The Key Government uses a strategy of politicisation to prioritise the 
development of New Zealand’s renewable, petroleum and mineral resources. It is 
in particular concern to the latter two that the Key Government shapes its own 
energy security rhetoric to legitimise its policy initiatives. First, the NZES 2011 
states that New Zealand has an abundance of petroleum and mineral resources, 
and that ‘[d]eveloping these resources can contribute to energy security and 
provide export earnings for New Zealand.’178 Second, that through developing 
New Zealand’s diverse energy portfolio (and mentioning petroleum reserves in 
particular) ‘we contribute to global energy security – and have been commended 
for doing so by the International Energy Agency.’179 These initiatives conflict 
with international efforts to address climate change, as the exploitation and 
consumption of coal and petroleum emit greenhouse gases. The Clark 
Government did not refer to New Zealand’s role to help global energy security 
through the development of petroleum resources: simply, this would contrast too 
starkly with its aspiration to be an international leader on climate change. The 
Key Government however, brings the concern for global energy security to the 
forefront of its political agenda. The key features of the Key Government’s 
presentation of energy security and energy issues will be outlined in the next 
sections. The analysis will elaborate on how the Key Government has 
appropriated energy security from the Clark Government, but shapes a 
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completely different rhetorical politicisation to support its distinct approach to 
energy, economic growth and climate change.  
 
Risk perceptions and economic growth 
 
In the NZES 2011 energy security is not politicised using the language of threat, 
nor does it imply that energy security should be governed within or above 
politics. The absence of the language of threat in the NZES 2011 is the most 
prominent point of difference with the NZES 2007. For instance, the current 
strategy does not refer to the energy security risks of oil dependency. The NZES 
2011 states that most of New Zealand’s oil is imported, ‘which exposes the New 
Zealand economy to volatile international energy prices. More efficient use and 
greater use of alternative transport fuels can reduce our exposure to oil prices.’180 
This exposure to price is not presented as a risk that requires government 
leadership or strong policy response. The NZES 2011 expects the future price of 
oil to rise and become volatile. In response it states that non­renewables will 
continue to play a role in the energy mix alongside an increasing role of 
renewables. It also highlights how fuel prices affect consumer choice which 
affects ‘the uptake of low­carbon fuels, new technologies and more efficient 
vehicles, vessels and aircraft.’181 Granted, and similar to the NZES 2007, the 
NZES 2011 references New Zealand’s continued fulfilment of its IEA obligations 
to hedge against the risk of another serious international oil supply disruption.182 
These concerns are not elaborated on, however.  
 
Neither is there a sense of uncertainty conveyed in regards to the ability of 
domestic or international energy markets to ensure energy security. This is 
evident in statements made elsewhere in the NZES 2011. For instance, while 
citing the importance of secure and competitive markets, the NZES 2011 states 
that ‘In the longer­term, investment in oil alternatives will boost transport energy 
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security.’183 And, that ‘[t]he Government recognises that alternative transport 
fuels derived from a range of sources have the potential to contribute to the 
development of a more energy efficient transport system.’184 Energy security is 
the referent object in itself, and as a concept does not clearly include the 
presentation of risks associated to price or supply. In the draft New Zealand 
Energy Strategy (NZES 2010) released by the MED in 2010, the certainty of the 
market to determine the future of transport energy mix was even clearer: ‘the 
Government will not pick winners: ultimately uptake of new energy sources and 
technologies will depend on the decisions made by consumers as they respond to 
prices.’ 185  Policy documents and government departments in the Clark 
Government presented high oil prices and oil dependency as an energy security 
risk that will affect the New Zealand economy. This was presented as a reason to 
transition to a low­carbon economy, thus supporting the development of climate 
change policy. The NZES 2011 clearly does not frame the issues in the same way, 
nor does it convey a sense of insecurity in the market to make the transition to a 
low­carbon economy.  
 
Energy security: security of supply 
 
The Key National Government reconceptualises energy security. This is to align 
with its focus on domestic concerns for New Zealand’s economic growth and the 
expectations of the voting­public. The emphasis on energy security’s link to social 
and economic necessity prioritises these concerns. This is part of its rhetoric to 
legitimise the development New Zealand’s resources. Prime Minister John Key 
stated that ‘[e]conomic growth is vital to providing New Zealanders and their 
families with the services and living standards they want and deserve.’186 First, in 
this respect, the NZES 2011 states that ‘[h]igh standards of energy security are 
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critical to New Zealand’s economic performance and social well­being – 
particularly in relation to oil and electricity.’187  As noted previously, the concern 
for economic growth has led to a focus in the NZES 2011 on developing New 
Zealand’s abundance of renewable energy resources, as well as the less­well 
known petroleum and mineral reserves that can generate export earnings. The 
NZES 2011 states that it is a necessity to do so on economic grounds and 
therefore implies that the Government’s policy response is a legitimate one: 
‘Developing all energy resources, subject to environmental considerations being 
managed, is necessary for our economic future.’188  
 
The Government’s support for the development of resources means that a 
concern for security of supply is prioritised in the NZES 2011’s concept of energy 
security. The strategy states that it continues to hold the goal of 90 percent of 
electricity generation to be from renewable sources by 2025 but importantly adds 
‘providing this does not affect security of supply.’189 The NZES 2011 elaborates 
on this by stating that a price on carbon will enhance the competitiveness of 
renewable generation. It adds however, that achieving the 90 percent renewables 
target ‘[…] must not be at the expense of the security and reliability of our 
electricity supply. For the foreseeable future some fossil fuel generation will be 
required to support supply security.’190 The notion of security of supply is often 
referenced in discourse on energy issues, and is a prime concern for New 
Zealand’s electricity sector. It is often referred to in relation to the reliability of a 
network that involves the delivery of electricity supply.191 Or, it can refer to 
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resource development, such as wind projects or diversity, that add to supply.192 
Likewise, the NZES 2011 states that ‘Significant discoveries of oil and gas 
resources will help boost New Zealand’s foreign earnings and domestic gas 
supplies.’ 193  This statement invokes economic as well as security of supply 
benefits (in terms of increasing New Zealand supply of gas). This does not 
articulate risks to legitimise a policy response as the Clark Government did.  
Instead, the NZES 2011 supports its policy initiative by arguing that developing 
New Zealand’s resources will be of combined economic and security of supply 
benefit.  
 
The Labour­led Government’s concept of energy security and climate change has 
been surpassed by a traditional focus on energy security; as the secure and 
reliable supply of energy. Scholars argue that security of supply is traditionally at 
the core of energy policy.194 This component of energy security has become 
inherent to the current model, and is common and persistent as a strategy 
today. 195  The NZES 2011 states that it will promote ‘energy security and 
affordability,’196 and is consistent with its emphasis on the benefits of developing 
resources for energy supply, and maintaining security of supply in the electricity 
sector.  This is not to suggest that energy prices are not concerns in New Zealand.  
 
The NZES 2011 in fact, highlights price concerns and incorporates them into its 
argument for diverse resource development. It states that New Zealand’s energy 
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resources can further contribute to economic growth and promote the well­being 
of New Zealanders, by ‘[p]roviding diverse sources of reliable energy at 
competitive prices within New Zealand.’197 In regards to developing renewable 
resources, it states that using a wide range of energy will ‘help make New 
Zealand more resilient to fluctuating commodity prices.’198 This is on the back of 
its recognition that the public is conscious of changes in electricity and petrol 
prices. In response the NZES 2011 states that it aims to keep energy as affordable 
as possible through competitive markets, and that New Zealand has lower 
energy prices than many other countries.199 This is more in reference to electricity 
than oil, as oil prices are set internationally and outside of the Government’s 
control. In the domestic electricity market however, the Government cites its 
major review in 2009 (after public concern was raised over price) that included 
proposals to ‘increase security of supply.’200 
 
Professor Ralph Sims states that in terms of energy security, in general, there are 
two major trends. The first is security alone, where the policy focus is on the 
development of coal, gas and oil. The second is a notion of climate change 
security, where the policy focus is on renewable energy.201 Likewise, Dr Richard 
Hawke from the Ministry of Economic Development identified the twin 
challenges of energy and energy security, and energy security and climate 
change.202 Bearing this in mind the NZES 2011 does refer to energy security in 
relation to the future development of renewable resources, energy efficiency and 
the diversification of transport fuels.203 It continues to recognise that both energy 
security and climate change are difficult global challenges. The dominant 
political narrative however, articulates the benefits that diverse resource 
development will bring to energy security and the economy. Thus in the NZES 
                                                          
197 Ibid. p. 6 
198 Ibid. p. 6 
199 Ibid. p. 13 
200 Ibid. p. 13 
201 Sims, “Interview.” 
202 Richard Hawke, "Interview," (2011).; Sims, "Interview." 
203 Ministry of Economic Development, "New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011 ­ 2021: Developing 
Our Energy Potential." p. 6, 10, 12, 16, 20 
66 
 
2011 energy security and climate change framework, energy security plays a very 
different role to what it did in the NZES 2007. Energy security is a distinct policy 
focus in itself, security alone, rather than something subsumed to the 
development of climate change policy.  
 
The heightened concern for economic growth, and security of supply, mean that 
energy security embodies these core issues. In the NZES 2007 there was a 
heightened concern to address the urgent issue of climate change. Thus energy 
security embodied risks that would need to be addressed by the new climate 
change policy framework. In comparison, energy security in NZES 2011 is a 
collection of policy measures that align with those of economic growth. This 
policy focus is reminiscent of the domestic energy policies that IEA member 
states pursued after the 1973/74 oil shocks. These policies included 
diversification of member states’ energy mix with alternative sources to oil 
(especially in power generation), increasing energy efficiency and development 
of their indigenous petroleum resources.204 First, under a heading What is energy 
security? the NZES states that  ‘On a system level, energy security is achieved 
when there are sufficient levels of energy resources reliably delivered via robust 
networks to meet changing demands over time.’205 This refers to the ability of 
energy supply to meet demand which is more simply, security of supply. Second, 
it states that ‘More efficient and flexible use of energy across society also 
contributes to system security.’ 206  This perhaps refers to demand­side 
management of energy consumption, for instance, efficiency can be viewed as 
reducing energy waste and demand through the use of more fuel efficient cars. 
Flexibility is less clear, and could be related to the diversity of the energy system, 
or the idea of having choices between different forms of energy. Third, the NZES 
2011 refers to the need for a resilient energy system. This is when the energy 
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system can ‘cope with shocks and change, for example from natural disaster or 
international events.’ 207 And not surprisingly, it suggests that, having a diversity 
of sources, rather than being reliant on a few dominant sources, enhances energy 
security and resilience to these shocks. These are very general statements: specific 
risks to New Zealand’s energy system are not elaborated on.  
 
The ambiguity towards energy security’s relationship to issues (other than 
supply disruptions) is clear when the NZES 2011 states that ‘Security is enhanced 
where energy resources can be sustained environmentally, socially and 
economically over time.’208 This primarily reflects a focus on secure supply of 
energy or in other words, security alone. First, this is clearly an idea of security in 
the long­term sense insofar as the supply of resources is sustained over time. 
Security however is used quite broadly, and it is not clear whether it is referring 
to any particular level of security, international, national or regional for instance. 
While it understands security to be related to environmental, social and economic 
issues, these concerns are not elaborated on.  This reflects the degree of 
ambiguity towards energy security in the NZES 2011; it is generally referenced as 
a benefactor of energy policy designed to contribute to economic growth. If the 
integration of environmental concerns with security were more prominent in the 
document then energy security would be presented through both an 
environmental lens and an economic one. However this is not the case.  
 
Energy security through an economic lens  
 
The retraction of the Clark Government’s politicised model of energy security is 
made clear in the MED’s approach to climate change policy. The NZES 2011 
tends to view energy security through an economic lens and separate to 
environmental concerns. First, the NZES 2011 does refer to climate change as a 
challenge. The Government aims to achieve its over­arching goals (prosperity, 
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security and opportunities) by focusing on four priority areas: diverse resource 
development, environmental responsibility, achieving efficient use of energy, 
and promoting energy security and affordability. Environmental responsibility is 
discussed, and has two areas of focus. First is best practice in environmental 
management for energy projects and second, is the reduction of energy­related 
greenhouse gas emissions.209 The former is in regard to a major programme 
review of the Resource Management Act, including reference to the National 
Policy Statement on renewable energy generation. The latter aims to monitor the 
adverse environmental effects of energy use and ‘address issues relating to access 
to, or allocation of natural resources.’210 Energy security is not associated to either 
of these policy initiatives, nor for instance, are the co­benefits between the 
reduction of GHG emissions and oil dependency presented in the tone of the 
NZES 2007. This is reflected elsewhere in the NZES 2011 where energy security is 
grafted onto longer­term projections of energy use. In these instances it is 
referred to in tandem with renewable resources, spoken of in relation to longer­
term investments in alternatives to oil, and in particular, energy efficiency.211 Yet 
these are not immediately or clearly associated to the language of reducing 
energy­related greenhouse gas emissions, which are referenced in the section 
‘Environmental responsibility.’212 
 
The emphasis in energy security on short­term risks to domestic security of 
supply and economic growth is reinforced by the omission of the term from 
policy documents, as well as in other government departments. The Clark 
Government politicised energy security across relevant government 
departments; energy security and climate change were issues that required an 
integrated policy response. The Key Government retracted this approach and 
centred energy security policy in the Ministry of Economic Development. In 
parliamentary Order Paper and Questions dated 23 September 2010, the Hon 
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Trevor Mallard (Labour) inquired with the current Minister of Transport, 
whether he or the office had received any correspondence regarding ‘global 
petroleum estimates and their impact on matters relating to his Transport 
portfolio since November 2008 […]’ The response of the Hon Steven Joyce 
(Minister of Transport) was that he had not, and that ‘Energy security and supply 
issues are the purview of the Minister for Energy and Resources.’ 213  The 
integration of energy security concerns with other relevant government 
departments has clearly failed to remain past the Clark Government. 
 
The Key Government institutionally approaches energy security through an 
economic lens. Energy security is dealt with as an economic and development 
issue rather than integrated conceptually with environmental concerns in other 
departments. First, energy security is addressed in a structurally different way to 
the Clark Government, and is predominantly the focus and concern of the 
Ministry of Economic Development. Given also the omission of energy security 
in current Statement of Intents released by the Ministry for the Environment,214 
and the infrequent use of the term in other documents, the predominant focus 
and narrative is centralised to the MED. Second, energy security is no longer 
used as the policy link between approaches to economic growth and climate 
change, as evident in comments made by the Minister for the Environment and 
Minister Responsible for Climate Change Issues, Hon Dr Nick Smith. Smith 
stated that the current ‘[g]overnment is committed to a carefully balanced agenda 
of both environmental and economic goals.’215 Energy security is not a feature of 
this agenda, nor it seems, is energy of primary strategic focus in the Ministry for 
the Environment’s development of climate change policy.   
 
The Ministry for the Environment is a major adviser on the sustainable 
development of New Zealand, which includes both international and domestic 
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matters related to climate change.216 In its Statement of Intent 2010­2013, it says it 
aims are to also give ‘policy advice, regulatory reforms and programmes that the 
Government requires to ensure that resources are used productively while 
maintaining environmental values,’217 and that the Ministry will work with other 
central government agencies to give advice on issues related to natural resources. 
In the current strategy energy security is not mentioned. Climate change policy is 
mentioned, particularly matters concerning the implementation of the Emissions 
Trading Scheme. But there is no urgency to address these issues in the discourse. 
In terms of risks associated to energy, or energy related issues such as climate 
change, the Ministry for the Environment considers that, 
 
Likely changes in our climate pose environmental, economic 
and social risks and opportunities. These risks and opportunities 
relate to rising sea levels, increases in flood events and droughts, 
changing wind and rainfall patterns, increased temperatures, 
and reduced frosts.218  
 
The risks associated to climate change are presented as uncertain, there being 
opportunities as well. This is in contrast to the views of the MED under the Clark 
Government, which stated that ‘there is a growing sense of urgency about the 
need to address the serious challenges of climate change.’219 Both Labour and 
National had different approaches to climate change and views on the urgency of 
the issue, as well as different ideas about how to address climate change policy. 
Previously under Labour, the urgency of climate change and the associated 
challenges of energy security meant that all relevant government departments 
concerning energy policy had to be engaged. The Clark Labour Government 
clearly tried to do this through bringing energy security to the forefront of 
departments’ mandates.  
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Where energy security was closely linked to climate change policy during the 
Clark Government, this is simply no longer the case in current strategy. Stuart 
Calman, the current Director of Climate Risk and Policy for the Ministry for the 
Environment, noted that there was quite an integration of climate change and 
energy security policy in previous government. Today, while the MfE and MED 
still operate in an integrated way to manage environmental, energy and 
economic issues, energy security tends to sit outside of this framework. 220  
Clearly also, the Key Government has a different approach to climate change 
policy which has affected how energy security is presented and dealt with in 
strategy. Unlike the Clark Government (who argued that New Zealand should be 
one of the first developed country’s to reduce emissions), the current 
Government has a more cautious approach to climate change policy in the 
country’s economic interests. The Minister Responsible for Climate Change 
Issues, Hon Dr Nick Smith argues that ‘as a small open trading nation, 
accounting for 0.2% of global emissions, tough emission reduction policies would 
just export emission­intensive industries offshore.’221 Currently New Zealand’s 
economic interests remain heavily tied to the agricultural sector, which also 
accounts for 50% of New Zealand’s emissions.222 New Zealand’s international 
climate change policy retains a commitment to securing an effective global 
agreement.223 It also recognises the implications that commitments to emissions 
reductions will have on New Zealand’s economy: specific priority areas include 
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agriculture and land use.224 A Cabinet paper states that ‘It is imperative that we 
continue to build understanding amongst the international community of the 
challenges in reducing emissions from agriculture, in particular grazing 
livestock.'225 It is no surprise that the Government would focus on the agriculture 
sector rather than energy in climate change policy: the energy sector has a 
proportionally (by international standards) high use of renewable in New 
Zealand electricity generation and therefore, low emissions. Granted, Hon Dr 
Nick Smith noted that this has declined given the increase in coal generated 
production.226 Simply, the energy security related aspects of New Zealand’s own 
climate change policy are not a predominant focus, therefore, why refer to energy 
security at all?  
 
The unravelling of the Clark Government’s politicised model of energy security 
and climate change is also made clear by the current ambiguity towards how 
energy security interrelates with other policy challenges. Where energy security 
is referenced by bureaucrats or officials from other departments, it is at times, 
ambiguous in regards to whether it is an environmental and economic issue or an 
economic issue alone. For instance, in the Ministry for the Environment the Hon 
Dr Nick Smith referred to greenhouse gas emissions in relation to energy 
security. In a Minister’s Position Paper, Hon Dr Nick Smith stated that examples 
of non­economic co­benefits from moving to a low­carbon economy include 
‘increased energy security from less reliance on fossil fuels.’227 Comparatively, in 
“Discussion Paper on Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in New 
Zealand Post­2012"  it states that, 
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 [...] even if domestic emission reductions were more costly in 
New Zealand than in other countries, it could still be in the 
national interest to pursue domestic emission reductions 
because of other co­benefits, such as economic development, 
energy security and local environmental gains.228 
 
While Hon Dr Nick Smith’s statement argues that reducing reliance on fossil 
fuels is a non­economic benefit (but a benefit nonetheless for energy security and 
climate change), the discussion paper suggests that it could be in our national 
interest to pursue emission reductions, for co­benefits of both energy security and 
economic development. There seems to be shifting views on the economic and 
energy security benefits of investing in more robust climate change policy. On 
one hand, energy security is a non­economic co­benefit of reduced reliance on 
fossil fuels. On the other hand, it is referred to alongside economic co­benefits to 
suggest that it is in the national interest to pursue emissions reductions.  
 
Energy security no longer has a clear role in international climate change policy 
in the Ministry for the Environment under the Key Government. Similarly, 
energy security is no longer used in foreign policy documents released under the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). MFAT’s overarching mission is 
that ‘New Zealand’s security and prosperity interests are advanced and 
protected, our voice is heard abroad.’229 It clearly articulates its current objective 
to further New Zealand’s economic growth prospects.230 First, energy security is 
not referenced in MFAT’s strategic documents, yet energy supply disruptions are 
presented as direct threats to ‘economic security.’ In an explanation of New 
Zealand’s current APEC priorities in regards to business costs and behind­border 
reforms in the World Trade Organisation ‘DOHA Development Round’ (DDA) 
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Negotiations and Free trade Agreements/Regional Trade Agreements, it states 
the following in relation to security: 
 
Neither New Zealand’s economic prosperity nor that of the region 
takes place in a vacuum. Economic security can be threatened by 
terrorism, threats to health or potential disruptions to energy 
supplies. New Zealand places a high priority on working with its 
APEC partners on these broader issues, which we see as a 
complementary mission to APEC’s core trade and economic 
work.231 
 
The referent object is economic security which is indirectly linked to New 
Zealand’s own economic prosperity in the Asia­Pacific region. Economic security 
in this sense refers broadly to a regional dynamic. The language of threat is used 
in reference to supply disruptions. In some respects then, current government 
departments appear to be talking past each­other. At the domestic policy level in 
the NZES 2011 disruptions to energy supplies are perceived as a security of 
supply issue in electricity generation and in oil security. MFAT links energy 
supply concerns directly to the term ‘economic security.’  
 
The policy response and interpretation of international energy security is clearly 
the purview of the MED. Under the Clark Government, energy security was 
included in the mandates of MFAT and MfE, recognised as part of the operating 
environment. This is simply not the case under the Key National Government. 
First, the NZES 2011 recognises international concerns for energy security, stating 
that ‘countries are striving to improve energy security, reduce pressure on the 
environment and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’232  As noted previously in 
this chapter, the NZES 2011 also refers to the challenges of energy security and 
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climate change in the global context. 233   Thus the interpretation of these 
challenges is through an economic lens. For instance, ‘[g]lobal challenges of 
energy supply and climate change will increasingly influence the availability and 
cost of energy.’234 The policy response to these concerns is first related to the 
economy and second, to the supply and use of energy. The NZES 2011 states that 
‘New Zealand future competitiveness will […] require innovative solutions in the 
sources and uses of energy – both renewable and non­renewable.’235 It is clearly 
stated in the passage that supply is responded to by developing all energy 
resources, and use the promotion of energy efficient practices. 236  There are 
common economic benefits highlighted for both policies. However, developing 
resources is ‘subject to environmental considerations’ while efficient use of 
energy will ‘reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’237 Concern for energy security, as 
the supply of energy through developing diverse resources, is in opposition to 
climate change policy. Energy security is considered something that is subject to 
environment considerations. It is not, as it was in the Clark Government, 
articulated as a co­benefit of climate change policy.  
 
The MED’s interpretation of the global challenge of energy security is shaped by 
the economic opportunities presented by increasing world energy demand. The 
NZES 2011 states that ‘For the next few decades at least, the world and New 
Zealand will need oil, gas and coal.’238 It also argues that there is an opportunity 
to develop New Zealand’s potential non­renewable resources that the country 
should grasp, ‘[p]rovided that the very highest standards of environmental 
protection are applied.’239 Not only can New Zealand gain from this, in export 
earnings, but as previously noted the NZES 2011 states that this will contribute to 
‘global energy security.’240 Energy development in other countries, according to 
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the NZES 2011, is also interpreted as an economic benefit for New Zealand. It 
states that New Zealand’s expertise and technologies can ‘assist other countries 
to develop their energy resources and generate income for New Zealand.’241 It is 
clear that the Key Government frames global energy security concerns as 
economic opportunities rather than risks of the international operating 
environment. This is a different approach to the Clark Labour Government who 
integrated the mandates of MFAT and MfE with the NZES 2007. This meant that 
international energy security issues were approached through a dual 
environmental and economic lens. In other words, energy security was 
integrated with the policy response to climate change and factored in on 
economic development aid in other countries.  
 
New Zealand’s global role to contribute to energy security, and the economic 
benefits of doing so, are not articulated in the policy mandate of MFAT. This is 
further evidence of the centralisation of policy response to international energy 
security concerns in the MED. And second, that these concerns are viewed 
through an economic lens and not as risks to international stability that require 
policy attention, or strong integration with economic development and climate 
change adaptation policy. In MFAT’s Statement of Intent 2010 – 2013,242 it refers 
to energy in a section entitled ‘Our Operating Environment: International 
Trends’, where ‘Competition for natural resources (including energy, water and 
food) is intensifying, including for fisheries in New Zealand’s region.’243 While 
this is quite broad, later examples in the document show that in terms of natural 
resources, New Zealand focuses on fisheries and climate change. For instance, it 
states that ‘[i]n recent years our understanding of threats to New Zealand’s 
prosperity has broadened to include environmental threats such as climate 
change, and the unsustainable use of shared resources, such as high seas 
fisheries.’244 In particular where common resources are concerned MFAT seeks to 
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achieve ‘an international environmental and natural resources agenda that 
advances New Zealand’s interests and supports New Zealand’s economic 
competitiveness.’245 Among the high­level measures it identifies reducing the 
number of whales caught in the Southern Ocean, reduction in illegal fishing, 
concerns for international rules and food markets, and ‘a world on track’ to 
reduce greenhouse­gas emissions by 50% by 2050.246 Evidently energy concerns 
do exist but currently they are not MFAT’s primary focus, but rather an indirect 
concern.  
 
MFAT’s SOI 2010­2013 states that it intends to ‘work through bilateral and 
regional mechanisms on trade, fisheries, transport, infrastructure, energy and 
tourism to help Pacific countries to grow their economies.’247 In this regard, 
MFAT intends to strengthen these relationships. 248  Renewable energy is 
mentioned by the Hon Murray McCully, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reference 
to strengthening New Zealand’s leadership in the South Pacific through using 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). 249  Development is related to New 
Zealand’s security and prosperity interests insofar as ‘Our ability to turn 
international connections into economic growth relies on the existence of a stable 
and secure environment.’250 Contributing to global security and development in 
poorer nations will contribute to this stable and secure environment.251 Energy 
concerns in international affairs are centred in development in the Pacific and at 
best, are part of a broader package to contribute to international stability through 
development aid in the Pacific region.  
 
The New Zealand Defence White Paper, released in 2010 by the Ministry of 
Defence, is consistent with MFAT’s approach to energy concerns. It does not 
present any specific energy security concerns in New Zealand’s interest to 
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address. For instance, it mentions resource competition with indirect 
consideration of energy therein, where ‘[a]s the world’s population increases, 
resources (water, food, energy and minerals) are likely to become scarce in some 
regions, leading to increased competition for their allocation.’252 In broader terms 
of ‘resources’ there is a reference to competition and its effects on regional 
stability in the Asia­Pacific. Under ‘Open trade routes’ it states that competing 
territorial claims in parts of maritime Asia will remain contested. While this 
competition may be expressed militarily, it argues that shared economic benefits 
could promote regional stability. However, ‘the combination of resource 
competition and narrowly defined national interest will continue to be a volatile 
mix.’253 
 
This omission of energy security from foreign policy mandates was not 
immediately evident at the beginning of the Key Government’s term; only 
appearing later when the first draft New Zealand Energy Strategy was released 
in 2010. In a Post­election brief released by MFAT, closely after the National 
Party won the general election in November 2008, it stated that ‘climate change 
increasingly needs to be seen as an energy security, economic and development 
issue, as well as an environmental one.’254 The Post­election brief suggests that 
initially, the Clark Government’s politicisation of energy security and climate 
change in international as well as domestic strategy remained institutionally. The 
whole­of­government approach to these concerns however, has been clearly 
retracted. The NZES 2011 is the only document that gives a policy response to 
energy security and climate change. But the role of energy security in this 
framework (in comparison to the Clark Government) is reconceptualised. The 
NZES 2011 frames its international response to global energy security through an 
economic lens. This policy response is no longer institutionally integrated with 
departments dealing with international climate change negotiations (MFAT and 
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MFE). The NZES 2011 redefines the place of energy security on the international 
agenda as an opportunity for economic growth. It is no longer a strategic focus 
for New Zealand’s international development aid. The Clark Labour 
Government comparatively, instituted the climate change, economic growth and 
energy security nexus into its development strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Key Government has adopted the Clark Government’s energy security and 
climate change framework, but has reshaped the energy security rhetoric to suit 
its policy initiatives. This is for all intents and purposes, a strategy of 
politicisation. Energy security embodies a heightened concern for security of 
supply and global supply challenges. The MED prioritises these concerns in its 
concept of energy security. This forms the basis of its rhetorical politicisation of 
energy security to legitimise the heightened policy focus on developing all 
energy resources.  This is not bolstered by articulating energy security risks, as 
the Clark Government did, but by clearly arguing for the benefits of this policy 
for the New Zealand economy. Centralising energy security concerns to the MED 
is also strategic and telling of the Key Government’s perspective of energy 
security’s place in policy; as an economic concern and policy focus alone, rather 
than something that is addressed through climate change policy outright. In 
comparison, highlighting threat or risk suggests that something needs to be done 
to mitigate these effects. To refer back to the introduction, security is a ‘move that 
takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue 
either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.’255 The politicisation of 
energy security and climate change under the Clark Government brought these 
risks to the forefront of debate, and sought to address them in an integrated way 
across government departments. Notably, it introduced government initiatives 
such as the National Policy Statement on renewable electricity generation in 
support of climate change objectives. It has more hall­marks of a security 
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argument than the Key Government’s current rhetoric. The tactical appeal of 
politicisation is no less powerful however, when energy security and economic 
concerns are invoked. The Key Government’s rhetoric prioritises global energy 
security and economic opportunities in capitalising on renewable, petroleum and 
mineral resources. This clearly aims to legitimise its energy policy initiatives. 
Energy security is used to support two very different priorities in energy policy. 
Why has this happened? Are there other factors involved that have shaped this 
process, or does it really come down to the government in power? The next 
chapter will explore the factors that have shaped the politicisation of energy 
security and climate change in New Zealand’s domestic and foreign affairs, and 
the subsequent restructuring of energy policy when the Key Government came 
into power. This will provide further insight into what has shaped New 
Zealand’s energy policy, and the nature of the country’s energy politics.  
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Chapter Five 
Energy security and political agendas 
 
There have been two distinct rhetorical politicisations of energy security between 
the Key and Clark Governments. The Clark Labour Government’s rhetorical 
politicisation emphasised energy security risks in order to legitimise its robust 
climate change policy. The Key National Government, in comparison, has 
prioritised security of supply in its rhetorical politicisation of energy security. 
This distinct energy security rhetoric aims to legitimise its policy to develop New 
Zealand’s energy resources. This chapter will examine why this shift has 
occurred. It will argue that because politicisation means an issue is debated and 
addressed within politics, it set the course for contestable views of energy 
security to develop on the political agenda. Two different rhetorical 
politicisations then manifested in policy because of three key factors. First, is the 
formative stage of energy policy in New Zealand. Second, the divisive 
constituency views of energy security. Third, are the economic and political 
conditions that favoured as well as hindered the development of each 
Government’s energy policy. These key factors will be highlighted across two 
main sections that analyse the development of each Government’s energy policy.  
The analysis will show how their distinct rhetorical politicisations of energy 
security were shaped by the favourable resonating conditions they could draw 
on, and the hindering conditions they defended their respective strategies against.  
 
The development of energy policy under the Clark Labour 
Government 
 
The Clark Government’s development of energy policy was against the backdrop 
of a strong, free­market approach to energy security. Its argument for a stronger 
role of government in the energy sector therefore, had to be convincing. 
Government leadership in the energy market through robust energy policy was 
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not established prior to the Clark Government. In New Zealand, since neo­liberal 
restructuring in the mid­1980s market competition has determined the direction 
of the domestic energy market, not the government. As Barry Barton points out, 
during this time of reform energy planning on the part of government went out 
of fashion. The Ministry of Energy was eliminated in 1989 as the government 
shed its ownership interests in oil and gas, and introduced commercial objectives 
into state­owned enterprises in electricity and coal.256 Energy policy in many 
ways is relatively new to New Zealand, and the reliance in the market to deliver 
energy security remains a strong feature of the domestic policy environment.257 
The fact that energy policy is not well­established in New Zealand worked in the 
Clark Government’s favour: there was a relatively clean slate as it were, to 
develop an energy policy. This would be successful particularly if perceived 
market failures of the energy system could be capitalised on. This has been used 
in energy security arguments before, where a market failure (or risk) is 
highlighted to invoke the need for a government response. This is exactly what 
the Clark Government did.   
 
The Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security drew on 
resonating conditions in events that turned political and public attention to the 
risks of New Zealand’s energy system. The Clark Government was attuned to 
these risks and politicised them in the development of its energy policy. In 2004 
Labour MP David Parker (before he was appointed Minister of Energy) stated 
that ‘[e]nergy policy is being given heightened consideration worldwide due to 
dramatic price increases, potential future constraints on fuel supplies and wide­
spread acknowledgement of the threat that climate change poses […] energy is 
one of the most important issues facing the world. New Zealand is no 
exception.’258 The public was also aware of these risks. First, several energy issues 
and concerns had arisen in the early 2000s. New Zealand had faced extreme dry 
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periods in 1992, 2001 and 2003, which placed considerable pressure on the hydro­
dams. This led to national energy savings campaigns to reduce the risk of 
shortages.259 Furthermore, the Maui gas field was depleting and concerns for 
New Zealand’s gas supply arose. 260  The capacity of New Zealand’s energy 
system to keep up with rising demand was put into question: the years after 2000 
saw a rise in economic activity and thus a rise in demand for energy resources.261 
Rising oil prices and debate over the capacity in the international oil system to 
keep up with demand were also prevalent in the public media.262  
 
A second favourable condition for politicisation was that political attention had 
turned to climate change policy, as during this time New Zealand ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol.263  This would require New Zealand to develop strategies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in line with its Kyoto commitments. In 2004 the 
then Minister for Energy, Hon Pete Hodgson, stated that two challenges would 
force a radically different energy system to emerge, ‘One is the coming peak 
global oil production, which will probably occur within our lifetimes or our 
children’s. The other is global climate change. Both of these render our current 
energy habits unsustainable.’ 264  Furthermore, ‘to make progress towards a 
sustainable energy system we need a long­term view of our interests and those of 
future generations of New Zealanders.’ 265  This required the government to 
develop climate change policy. 
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Public and stakeholder resistance to climate change policy however, created a 
hindrance to policy development. As Geoff Bertram and Simon Terry point out, 
both Labour and National accept that ‘a price on carbon’ is essential to a policy 
response to climate change. 266 The Labour Government’s attempts however, to 
introduce a price via a carbon tax or similar ‘have repeatedly been abandoned in 
the face of strong lobbying by major emitters and their supporters.’267 Opposition 
to the ‘fart­tax’, in reference to the carbon price Labour proposed for the release 
of methane gas in the agricultural sector, was an example of this lobbying and 
resistance. Despite this resistance, the Clark Government decided to sacrifice a 
large amount of political capital and continue with the formation of a New 
Zealand energy strategy. 268  This resistance shaped the Clark Government’s 
response in energy policy. 
 
The Clark Government’s politicisation of energy security legitimised its robust 
climate change policy in the face of this opposition. The Clark Government 
politicised energy security risks that affect the New Zealand economy and that 
bring uncertainty to the domestic energy market. Furthermore, it argued that 
these risks are exacerbated if New Zealand does not form a robust policy 
response to climate change. This effectively highlights that while climate change 
policy will impact on New Zealand’s agricultural sector, not doing anything will 
exacerbate the risks to long­term energy security and thus to the national 
economy. When recently interviewed for this thesis, David Parker noted that the 
government wanted to show that they were prepared to say that ‘we’re going to 
change,’ and would do so through developing a national energy strategy.269 This 
was on the back of failed climate change policy initiatives resisted by lobbying in 
the agricultural sector. Bearing this in mind, it makes political sense to re­focus 
the debate to the very thing that ensures New Zealand’s key industries function: 
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the secure, reliable and affordable supply of energy. Highlighting that current 
business­as­usual practice is putting the future of energy security at risk provides 
a counter­argument to opposition of climate change policy.   
 
There were favourable political and economic conditions that the Government 
capitalised on, and less ideal resistance that shaped its approach to energy 
security in policy. No doubt, the election of the Clark Government to its third 
term in 2005 gave it the opportunity to pursue its new energy policy. According 
to David Parker, the country was enjoying a relative period of prosperity which 
meant the public was open to thinking about other issues, particularly climate 
change.270 The Government decided to make a move, as it were, and push its 
political agenda for climate change further into the heart of economic policy­
formation.271 With the backing of Prime Minister Helen Clark and Michael Cullen, 
David Parker was instructed to go ahead and get ‘the policy settings right.’272 
These policy settings clearly involved giving a clear indication that energy 
security concerns and climate concern would be addressed at the same time, 
evident in the NZES 2007. 
 
The Clark Government used its political power to restructure how energy 
security, climate change and economic issues were to be institutionally addressed. 
The Government’s politicisation of energy security embodied a tactical move to 
institutionally support the new approach to energy policy. This involved placing 
climate change at the heart of energy policy and economic development by 
integrating the ministerial portfolios and centering the move in the MED. First, in 
the Government’s third term David Parker was made both the Minister of Energy 
and Minister Responsible for Climate Change Issues by Prime Minister Helen 
Clark, who also gave him co­signing authority over papers from other ministries 
that impacted on his climate change portfolio.273 Second, the Government’s goal 
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was to provide certainty on the future policy and regulatory environment, 
increase awareness of the energy challenges, develop a more informed and 
inclusive decision­making process, through an all­encompassing government 
process led primarily by the Ministry of Economic Development.274 The Clark 
Government wanted not only to push energy policy in a particular direction, but 
also wanted to change the institutions and the processes through which this 
policy would be formed. This move faced obstacles. Here David Parker notes that 
the policy pursued when he was Minister met with some resistance from the 
MED.  According to Parker, the MED was ‘more fixated on energy security rather 
than climate change,’ and asked him whether the strategy was about climate 
change or economic growth and energy security.275 Thus between bureaucrats 
and politicians, risks and the appropriate policy response are contested.  
 
This level of debate on energy security creates an environment in which 
politicians need to clearly argue their case convincingly to win support. Thus the 
presentations of energy security, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, 
pander to the audience of energy policy; political and government opponents, as 
well as key stakeholders and market actors in the energy sector. This is 
particularly relevant to the Clark Government that clearly faced resistance from 
the Opposition and within government departments for its approach to energy 
security and climate change.  
 
The Government’s energy policy was limited by particular resistance from 
market participants and key stakeholders. This group shaped its own argument 
for energy security in response to the NZES 2007. In order to argue its own case 
against NZES 2007, market participants used security arguments to highlight the 
threats climate change policy would pose to New Zealand’s energy security. As 
evident in the submissions to the NZES 2007 there was a concern that climate 
change policies would threaten security of supply. The electricity generator and 
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retail company Genesis Energy argued that a more aggressive approach to 
reducing thermal generation would place ‘security of supply’ at risk, for instance, 
if the gas­fired Huntly Power station was phased out of electricity generation too 
quickly.276 Likewise, the submission made by the Gas and LPG Associations 
stated that ‘Insufficient attention was paid to […] the contribution other fuels can 
make to energy security and diversity.’277 Todd Energy New Zealand (which 
owns and operates in natural gas, oil, LPG, electricity, as well as cogeneration 
and solar heating)278  used threat language in specific reference to the National 
Policy Statement on renewable electricity generation. The energy company stated 
that where ‘there are very good reasons for thinking that overzealous pursuit of 
renewable energy generation in the medium term (as in the 90% by 2025 objective) 
could […] pose a threat to New Zealand’s energy security.’279 For energy industry 
participants in gas and oil extraction, and electricity generation, energy security 
was therefore presented as an area of concern, and at risk, if renewable energy 
was too heavily focused on by the Government. Todd Energy New Zealand 
politicised energy security in this way in order to argue against the NZES 2007 
policy initiatives. 
 
The Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security responded to 
criticisms in a symbolic way; arguing that the Government could address energy 
security through climate change policy. Second, by highlighting the long­term 
risks to energy security, and the greater urgency to address climate change, it 
aimed to prioritise these concerns over short­term risks to security of supply 
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articulated by the market. But different perceptions not only of risks but how 
they should be governed, is a crucial tension at the heart of the energy policy 
debate. Securitisation Theory purports that the language of threat is a tactical 
move, and used to legitimise governance of an issue within or above politics. 
Under the Clark Government energy security embodied risks to the energy 
system, and was presented as a benefit of climate change policy. Climate change 
policy required stronger leadership of government in the market through policy 
initiatives that promote renewable energy. This was particularly difficult facing a 
strong, free­market culture that dominates the domestic policy environment.280 
Market participants and stakeholders who criticised the NZES 2007 argued that 
energy security was put at risk by the policy interventions. Energy security 
embodies a tactical move to legitimise this position. 
 
These contestable views on energy security have been given voice through the 
Clark Government’s initial politicisation of the concept. Clearly energy security 
risks have been politicised in response and used in New Zealand energy politics 
to argue against climate change policy. More so perhaps than promoting change. 
The prominent New Zealand mining company Solid Energy argued that in the 
case that New Zealand adopted climate change strategies which ‘addressed risks 
of high future energy costs but assumed weak [and] early international on 
climate change,’281 the company would take measures to address energy security 
and affordability. These measures included the accelerated development of 
indigenous energy resources. This is a more subtle argument which, in fact, 
argues that if New Zealand adopts early climate change policy this would affect 
energy security and affordability, and hence, Solid Energy would need to address 
this through increasing security of supply by developing resources. Professor 
Ralph Sims of Massey University states that ‘security is first and foremost 
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carrying on with business­as­usual, regardless of where the energy comes 
from.’282 Evidently energy supply is important in the mid­term, and that in spite 
of the effects that developing gas, coal and petroleum resources would have on 
greenhouse gas emissions (consumed on New Zealand shores or overseas), 
energy security alone remains the priority. This is as equally tactical and 
convenient an argument as the NZES 2007’s emphasis on long­term risks to 
energy security to support climate change policy.  
 
The Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security was limited 
by the opposition, thus its politicisation did not lead to a successful 
institutionalisation. The NZES 2007 emphasises long­term risks to the energy 
system, such as oil dependency and the uncertainty in the domestic energy 
market, and the need to address climate change in policy; all of which are 
exacerbated if the Government does not give clear signals and leadership in the 
energy sector. This view though, is hindered by the concern for security of 
supply that is epitomised in the current energy strategy. Barry Barton points out 
that energy security has a time dimension, where some problems are short­term, 
and that risk is difficult to evaluate.283 He states that, 
 
Security, after all, is no more the protection from the risk of 
harm. Risk is notoriously difficult for individuals to evaluate. 
[…] And we are all at sea in estimating the risk of events of low 
probability. These tendencies affect political action, so that we 
invest far more in maintaining some kinds of security than 
others.284 
 
This explains why in the energy security debate today the Hon Gerry Brownlee 
argued that ‘Improving energy security and energy affordability are key concerns 
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[…] In my view, these issues were not accorded a sufficiently strong priority in 
the 2007 NZES.’285  The NZES 2007 addressed long­term risks of energy security 
and climate change, while the Key National Government has greater concern for 
short­term risks of climate change policy on security of supply. In response, the 
current energy spokesman for Labour Charles Chauvel, argues that ‘[t]he 
confusion and uncertainty created by National’s climate change policy is putting 
New Zealand’s energy security at risk.’286  
 
The two Governments’ rhetorical politicisations of energy security resonate with 
the two sides of the divisive constituencies in the energy debate. First, the way 
energy security was presented in current strategy aligns to the language used by 
market actors and key stakeholders who criticised aspects of the NZES 2007. 
Security of supply is emphasised in the concept of energy security by this group. 
Second, and one point of difference between the criticisms and the NZES 2011, 
the language of threat is used by market actors critiquing the NZES 2007. Energy 
security is put at risk by policy interventions in the market. This is to prioritise a 
business­as­usual approach of government in energy policy. While the language 
used is different, the political agendas of the Key Government and these market 
participants align in the common perception that the market will determine the 
direction of energy choices, energy use and energy security. Hence, as will be 
shown in the next section, the Key National Government drew on this 
constituency to support its energy strategy. As a result energy security was 
shaped by the views of this group, and set to align with the goals of the 
incumbent Government in the wake of a the Global Financial Crisis. The Key 
Government also faced opposition from a constituency group whose energy 
security rhetoric aligns more closely with the Clark Labour Government.  
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The development of energy policy under the Key National 
Government 
 
The Key National Government adopted the energy security label, but for a 
different political agenda. Clearly it would, and did, find support in its 
constituency who had opposed the Clark Government’s energy security strategy. 
First and foremost however, the unravelling of the Clark Government’s 
particular politicisation of energy security and climate change was in part, due to 
the loss in the general election to the National Party in November 2008. The 
opposing side now had the opportunity to prioritise its views on energy security 
in policy. Upon the release of the initial draft NZES in 2010, the MED stated that 
‘The strategies have been updated to align with current government energy 
policy priorities and to reflect a stronger focus on economic development.’ 287 
Second, the climate change and energy portfolios are no longer held by the same 
Minister. The Hon Gerry Brownlee was appointed Minister for Energy and 
Resources, while Hon Dr Nick Smith was appointed the Minister for Climate 
Change Issues, and Hon Tim Groser became the Minister Responsible for 
International Climate Change negotiations. The rhetorical politicisation of energy 
security that highlighted risks in support of domestic climate change policy, was 
simply no longer applicable to the strategic focus of the National Government. 
And the Clark Government’s approach to energy policy­formation was also no 
longer applicable.  
 
From the outset, the National Government wanted to emphasise the importance 
of security of supply in energy policy. As stated previously, prior to the election 
in November 2008, the then National Party Energy spokesman Gerry Brownlee 
stated that ‘a National­led Government will maintain an unrelenting focus on 
security of energy supply.’288 This could be considered in line with early efforts to 
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repeal the Electricity (Renewable Preference) Bill in parliament so that all 
resources would hold a short­term and mid­term role in base­load generation, as 
well as giving a clear indication in the draft NZES 2010 to develop New 
Zealand’s indigenous resources. Upon election, the Hon Gerry Brownlee stated 
that energy security and affordability had not been addressed in previous 
strategy, and that if New Zealand is to improve economic performance, ‘we must 
be able to ensure that the electricity and fuel needs of a growing society can be 
and are met.‘289 Clearly security of supply was prioritised in National’s new 
approach to energy security. Security of supply was the thrust of its argument in 
response to the Clark Government’s energy policy. Thus the Key National 
Government perceives energy security in a traditional sense as the secure and 
reliable supply of energy. Its logical energy policy response is to develop these 
resources, which sits comfortably with the Government’s goal of economic 
growth.  
 
The wake of the Global Financial Crisis was a favourable condition for the Key 
National Government’s policy response to energy security, centred in concerns 
for economic growth and security of supply. The financial crisis that occurred in 
early 2008, which led to the global economic recession, most certainly had a 
political toll on climate change policy. Internationally, the financial crisis 
heightened fears of the cost emissions would place on already strained 
economies.290 For New Zealand, economic concerns were high on the political 
agenda and were only made more important by the economic recession. Upon 
his election Prime Minister John Key unveiled his Cabinet and pledged to ‘focus 
on boosting economic growth and tackling the global financial crisis in a country 
suffering recession.’291 The politicisation of energy security risks in energy policy 
has taken a backseat to the greater political focus on managing the crisis. 
                                                          
289 Brownlee, "Government Consulting on Energy Policy." 
290 Muriel Newman, "Comment: Climate Change Review Echoes World Trend," The National 
Business Review, http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/comment­climate­change­review­echoes­world­
trend­37859. 
291 AFP, "New Zealand's Pm­Elect Unveils Cabinet with Focus on Economy," 
www.channelnewsasia.com, 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/390354/1/.html. 
93 
 
Immediate economic concerns weigh heavily on the current government’s 
political agenda as well as the voting public. The energy policy response to these 
concerns has been to supersede the Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation 
of long­term energy security risks. Given the shock of the crisis to the national 
economy, it is not surprising that the Key National Government would be 
successful in pushing through its pre­existing campaign agendas: the unrelenting 
focus on security of supply and retracting the Labour Government’s robust 
domestic climate change policy.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, energy security also disappeared from key foreign 
policy documents following the 2008 election. The National Government’s 
development of its distinct rhetoric is consistent with its economic approach to 
energy security, and its markedly different approach to climate change policy. 
Helen Clark’s Labour Government considered climate change as an opportunity 
to demonstrate to other nations that it was possible to implement emissions 
reductions policy without imposing high costs on the economy. 292  The Key 
Government aims to promote international efforts and rules that ‘accommodate 
New Zealand’s circumstances and interests, and are affordable.’293 This sentiment 
was reiterated by Prime Minister John Key when he stated ‘We campaigned 
solidly on taking a balanced approach to climate change, balancing our 
environmental responsibilities with our economic opportunities,’ and 
furthermore that ‘We don't want to be a global leader in climate change.’294 These 
comments were echoed by Hon Dr Nick Smith, who argued that the goals of the 
Labour Government to lead the world on climate change did more harm than 
good to New Zealand’s international reputation, and said ‘It is just unrealistic to 
continue to pretend we are, or can be, world leaders in reducing emissions.’295 
The Key National Government essentially re­focused energy security’s place in 
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strategy to the Ministry of Economic Development alone. The MED states that 
the current draft strategies are not action plans but sharply­focused statements of 
government energy policy, and that ‘[b]y focusing on near­term actions, the 2007 
strategies – and the NZEECS in particular – quickly became out of date.’296 These 
near­term actions, evidently, are those that can stimulate economic growth in the 
wake of a global economic recession.  
 
The Key Government’s draft NZES 2010 (and the finalised NZES 2011) gave a 
clear signal that the energy market would respond to fundamentals of this 
market, rather than the government responding to the risks of the market 
through energy policy. The draft NZES 2010 stated that New Zealand has an 
abundance of resources (including less well known petroleum and mineral 
reserves) and that ‘it is a priority of this government to develop those 
resources,’297 in the interest of stimulating the economy. The finalised NZES 2011 
did not dramatically change this tack. Thus the response to the rising 
international demand for energy is to increase the availability of New Zealand’s 
resources for export. Solid Energy epitomised this view, stating that ‘[i]n a world 
increasingly starved for available, affordable energy and other commodities 
many countries are threatened ­ but our indigenous natural resources make us 
one of the world's richest nations.’ 298  The development of these resources 
therefore, would take opportunity of the international demand for resources 
rather than being an area of concern.  
 
The Key National Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security 
resonated with its constituency who had felt the NZES 2007 compromised its 
industries. Energy companies need favourable political, legislative and 
investment climates in order to fund and continue their projects, hinging on the 
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certainty that they have a future place in the market. TrustPower argued that the 
energy security goals under the NZES 2007 were unlikely to be met, because, if a 
‘promise’ of carbon pricing post 2012 was made ‘fossil fuelled generation will be 
concerned that their generation will be displaced […] and renewable generation 
will have the risk of not receiving future income if carbon pricing is does not 
eventuate.’ 299  For example, the Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Association of New Zealand (PEPANZ) considered that the NZES 2007’s focus 
on renewable resources in electricity generation, and phasing out of non­
renewable resources from base­load generation, would pose a number of risks to 
the gas market. They supported this argument by stating that gas­fired 
generation underpins renewable generation and that ‘the key issue of energy 
security [is] if New Zealand places too much reliance on renewable energy.’300 
The issue of energy security for PEPANZ is really about the certainty of its 
position in the market. The Government’s policies would ‘[provide] explorers (i.e. 
PEPANZ’s members) with no degree of certainty that there will be a sustained 
development of the New Zealand gas market […].’301 Furthermore, that growth 
in the gas industry would be constrained by impeded investment and 
development.  
 
Energy security in the NZES 2011 is a clear policy focus in itself, rather than the 
embodiment of risks to the energy system in the NZES 2007. As argued in 
Chapter Four, the focus on security of supply and development of all energy 
resources means that the Key Government’s approach to energy security is 
characterised by a ‘security alone’ mind­set. By projecting this view, the NZES 
2011 clearly allayed concerns in the energy market that some energy participant’s 
future position in that market would be compromised by the NZES 2007. For 
instance, in its submission to the NZES 2010, PEPANZ stated that it ‘supports the 
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priority recognition given in the strategy to the concept of energy security, a 
glaring omission from the 2007 strategy.’302 The Key National Government is 
giving a clear signal to the energy market that it does not intend to intervene in 
the future of New Zealand’s energy system. This is why it does not invoke risks 
to the system, as to invoke risks would mean that the Government would have to 
address these risks. This response is in line with the views espoused in the NZES 
2011 (as argued in Chapter Four): market uncertainty does not pose risks great 
enough to prioritise a strong policy response to climate change. The market, 
ultimately, will respond to the challenges of climate change and energy security.   
 
A favourable condition for the Key National Government (and less ideal for the 
Clark Government) is a low articulation of energy issues in terms of risk. While 
the public has been concerned about the price of energy, discourse does not 
naturally invoke energy security risks. Professor Ralph Sims identified low 
public awareness of energy issues as a key problem in New Zealand. He added 
that there will be ‘no change in policy unless [there is] a change in public 
attitude.’ 303  As highlighted in the Introduction, Nobuo Tanaka, Executive 
Director the IEA, argues that the world is facing unprecedented uncertainty in 
the energy market. This is not just uncertainty in the market itself, but crucially in 
how governments will respond to the complexity of energy issues today in their 
energy policy. This uncertainty was included in the Clark Government’s 
rhetorical politicisation of energy security, but not in the current NZES 2011. The 
Clark Government’s argument may have found resonance with a particular 
constituency. The Key Government’s energy policy however, shows clearly that 
articulating energy security in terms of risk has been limited by the opposing 
discourse of certainty and reliance in the free­market. This still leaves the long­
term risks of energy security and climate change in the eyes of opposition to the 
draft NZES 2010, insufficiently responded to in policy (even if not publicly 
articulated in terms of risk.) 
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The Key Government faced resistance to its new energy policy stance and 
response to energy security. The Green Party gave rather forthright opinions on 
the draft NZES 2010, stating that ‘We cannot end our addiction to fossil fuels, 
lower emissions or achieve energy security by digging up more of what we are 
trying to use less of.’304 This is an effort to prioritise the concept of energy 
security and climate change, over energy security that emphasises security of 
supply. On 16 December 2008, in reference to the Electricity (Renewable 
Preference) Repeal Bill, the Green Party co­leader Jeanette Fitzsimons argued that 
the Minister for Energy, Hon Gerry Brownlee, ‘says that we need to build more 
fossil­fuelled plants for security of supply,’ and in retort argued that ‘if we want 
security of supply we need a diversity of renewable sources.’305  She then stated 
that focusing on security of supply (meaning that supply can meet demand) and 
building more supply, is unreliable and expensive, in comparison to demand­
side measures of efficiency and home insulation. Finally, after highlighting both 
supply and demand­side facets of energy policy, she states that ‘if Gerry 
Brownlee wants energy security he needs to focus a lot more on the demand side 
than New Zealand ever has.’306 Clearly Fitzsimons highlights that the focus on 
security of supply alone will not achieve what the Green Party regard as energy 
security. 
 
In opposition to the draft NZES 2010, Labour energy spokesman Charles Chauvel 
argued that National has a lack of oversight in energy policy, that ‘according to 
the Electricity Commission, energy security is deteriorating […] and prices keep 
escalating.’ In particular, its hands­off approach has ‘been exposed’ from a poorly 
implemented home insulation scheme.307  Chauvel’s comments show that energy 
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security is considered as something that can only be addressed with a strong 
government policy response, and that there is no security in leaving the market 
to address long­term risks to the energy system. Chauvel’s comments also 
resonate with the concerns of key stakeholders who have expressed opposition to 
the draft NZES 2010.  The Environment and Community Development Centre 
argued that ‘generally, the draft NZES and NZEECS put a heavy reliance on 
markets to produce solutions, even where this approach is not appropriate or 
workable (e.g. energy security).’308 The long­term energy security risks are also 
politicised by this group, in order to argue that these issues need to be addressed 
in the finalised NZES 2011. As Chapter Two argues, to highlight risks or threats 
to energy security is to imply that these risks require governance, therefore, 
should be prioritised in policy or political debate. The Wellington City Council 
argued that ‘most targets refer to 2015 and given the risks with energy security 
and climate change, the Council believes New Zealand’s energy strategy needs to 
have a long­term approach.’ 309  It also argues that the strategy should find 
pathways for ‘New Zealand to reduce fossil fuel dependency in order to manage 
increasing fossil­fuel energy costs, energy security risks and carbon costs.’310 
Local Government New Zealand states that ‘A key difference between this draft 
NZES and the current strategy [NZES 2007] is its more candid recognition of 
impending issues in the longer­term, particularly around the future use of oil and 
fossil fuels.’311  Evidently this reflects how Labour energy spokesperson Charles 
Chauvel refers to energy security and energy strategy, as well as the NZES 2007. 
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This resistance coincided with a marked change between the draft NZES, 
released in 2010, and the finalised NZES 2011. First, in the draft NZES 2010, the 
Key Government did use an energy security argument to support the 
development of renewable, petroleum and mineral resources. In regards to the 
latter however, the argument was less explicit. For instance, the draft NZES 2010 
stated that ‘boosted’ energy security is a benefit of developing a mix of renewable 
energy resources, alongside other benefits of creating jobs, and increasing the 
availability of energy to assist economic growth.312 When it came however to oil 
and gas finds, it stated that ‘[t]he effect of future gas or oil finds on New Zealand 
energy security is difficult to forecast and will depend on the size of discoveries 
[…]’313 Resistance to the exploration by foreign companies in New Zealand off­
shore basins was vocal and tense: public opposition and protests by Greenpeace 
in April through to July of 2011 were prevalent in mainstream media, and a hot 
topic of debate. 314  The Government however, did not change its stance to 
promote oil and gas exploration in policy.  
 
The marked change in language appeared in the NZES 2011 released recently in 
August. The rhetorical politicisation of energy security in the NZES 2011, more 
subtle in the draft NZES 2010, included a new emphasis on global energy 
security. As outlined in Chapter Four, the NZES 2011 states that New Zealand 
can contribute to global energy security through the development of petroleum 
and mineral resources.315 It states also how New Zealand was commended for 
this policy measure by the International Energy Agency. Furthermore, that this is 
part of New Zealand’s ‘global role.’ 316  This language and argument was simply 
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not included in the draft NZES 2010. In addition, after the release of the 2011, 
Hon Hekia Parata stated that ‘We […] can’t ignore the major economic 
opportunity that continuing global oil demand could provide New Zealand.’317 
In light of this political rhetoric, New Zealand’s contribution to global energy 
security is clearly an economic benefit and marks the Key Government’s views of 
rising international energy demand; an economic opportunity. Thus the 
rhetorical politicisation of global energy security serves to bolster this argument, 
particularly against the tension this could have with New Zealand’s climate 
change commitments.  This is a distinct argument to the Clark Labour 
Government, who prioritised the goal for New Zealand to be an international 
leader on climate change (and shaped its presentation of energy security 
accordingly). The Key Government have responded to this argument, 
counteracting it with a redefinition of New Zealand’s global role: to contribute to 
global energy security. Like the Clark Government, energy security is shaped to 
convince key stakeholders and opposition of the merits of this policy response.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The two rhetorical politicisations of energy security have been used to argue for 
two different energy strategies. This occurred because of three key factors 
brought to light in this chapter. First, the formative stage of energy policy in New 
Zealand. Second, divisive constituency views of energy security. Third, economic 
and political conditions that favoured as well as hindered the development of 
each Government’s energy policy. The Clark Government pushed its perspective 
on energy security and climate change when economic and social conditions 
were in its favour. When the Key Government came to power it brought its 
prioritisation of economic growth and its different approach to climate change 
policy. The impacts of the Global Financial Crisis conveniently suited this agenda. 
The Key Government’s argument for energy security, framed by stimulating 
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economic growth, resonated with the crisis. In addition, the Clark and Key 
Governments’ distinct energy policies are also shaped by two competing 
perspectives on energy security risks that are debated among key market actors 
and stakeholders in energy policy. The two competing sides frame energy 
security risks in support of its differing views on climate change and the role of 
government in the energy sector. As with the Key and Clark Governments 
respectively, one side places emphasis on security of supply alone. It raises 
concerns for economic growth and the certainty of business­as­usual in the 
energy market, which would be affected by strong climate change policies. The 
other side places emphasis on the long­term risks associated to both energy 
security and climate change. The ability of the market to address these concerns 
without government leadership and action in policy is questioned. These divisive 
constituency views have resonated with each Government’s rhetorical 
politicisation of energy security.  
 
The Government in power, with support from the constituency and favourable 
economic and political conditions, has meant two very different approaches to 
energy security have manifested in energy policy. The less ideal conditions have 
also shaped the distinct politicisations of energy security. Government must 
argue its case convincingly, in which its interpretation of energy security has had 
a prominent role. Thus different energy security risks are contested, and highly 
politicised in New Zealand energy politics. Current energy strategy is now 
heading in a divergent direction from the former Clark Government. 
Politicisation has thus lead to inchoate political discourse on energy security. 
Whether politicisation has helped or hindered the development of energy policy 
in New Zealand is left to be decided, and the task of discussion in the final 
chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
Energy security is a highly politicised and contested concept in New Zealand 
politics. Two distinct rhetorical politicisations of energy security have been used 
to legitimise the Clark and Key Government’s respective energy policies. The 
Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security prioritises long­
term risks to the energy system. This aimed to legitimise more robust climate 
change policy. In comparison, the Key Government uses politicisation to bring 
security of energy supply to the forefront of its political agenda. This is to 
support its policy initiative to develop renewable, petroleum and mineral 
resources.  While politicisation has led to greater salience of energy security in 
New Zealand’s energy policy overall, clearly it has coincided with divergence in 
energy policy. A final question remains: has politicisation of energy security 
helped or hindered the development of energy policy in New Zealand? This 
chapter will address this question in two sections. The first section will provide a 
critical overview of the findings from the previous chapters. The second section 
evaluates the effects politicisation has had on New Zealand energy policy 
development. 
 
The discussion in these sections will suggest that the Clark Government’s 
politicisation of energy security helped stir a necessary debate on New Zealand’s 
energy system and future. It has brought energy security onto the political 
agenda. Energy security however, remains a contested concept as a result of 
politicisation. Polarised views have led to flip­flopping rhetoric in energy policy 
between the Key and Clark Governments. First, this is problematic because it has 
led to political uncertainty for the energy market. Second, the current market­
orientated concept of energy security means that policy will follow energy 
market trends. Response to energy security is market­driven therefore, 
developing New Zealand’s petroleum and mineral resources responds to 
103 
 
increasing international energy demand. This rhetorical politicisation of energy 
security does not substantially hinder policy towards New Zealand’s domestic 
energy system change. The current energy security rhetoric does however, make 
domestic and international climate change policy appear less coherent. Overall 
the politicisation of energy security has helped contribute to what will hopefully 
be, a rising debate on New Zealand energy policy. The debate is needed, it is 
continuing, and this suggests that energy security’s place in policy will not go 
without being questioned.  
 
Overview 
 
The thesis addressed three questions: has energy security been politicised in New 
Zealand politics? If so, how has it been politicised? And finally, has this hindered 
of helped the development of energy policy in New Zealand? The politicisation 
of energy security in New Zealand has followed international trends in energy 
discourse. Chapter One highlighted that energy security has become more 
important in international debate. The relationship between energy security risks, 
well­functioning economies and climate change has been brought to the attention 
of both scholars and policymakers. It is also debated by scholars and policy­
makers, who have argued that the concept can no longer be understood as 
simply the secure, reliable and affordable supply of energy. The concept of 
energy security must be re­conceptualised to include new environmental and 
social concerns. Likewise it has been brought to the attention of policymakers in 
New Zealand. It is the subject of debate between politicians, bureaucrats and key 
stakeholders in energy policy. 
 
The Clark Labour Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security 
brought the risks of New Zealand’s energy system onto the political agenda. This 
occurred at the same time as a strong policy focus on addressing climate change. 
Through a strategy of politicisation the Clark Government forged a whole­of­
government approach to energy security and climate change. The Government 
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institutionalised an integrated approach to both issues in the mandates of 
government departments. The appointment of David Parker as Minister of 
Energy and Minister Responsible for Climate Change Issues further deepened 
this institutionalisation of energy security and climate change. These moves 
placed climate change at the heart of energy and economic policy development, 
the MED, and linked this policy approach in the mandates of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry for the Environment and the Ministry of 
Transport. This mimics examples of politicisation overseas that were cited in 
Chapter One. First, energy was placed at the heart of climate change agenda at 
G8 in 2005. In the U.S. Hillary Clinton established the International Energy 
Affairs at the State Department to demonstrate the importance of energy security 
to U.S. Foreign Policy. President Obama also highlighted the dire need for the US 
to reduce its oil dependency stating that ‘America will not be held hostage to 
dwindling resources, hostile regimes and a warming planet […]"318  And finally, 
in his remarks to the Climate Change Conference in Cancun last year, United 
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki­Moon stated that ‘We will never assure energy 
security – or international security – without climate security.’ 319  The Clark 
Government’s politicisation of energy security risks supported the 
institutionalisation of the climate change, energy and economic policy­formation 
nexus in New Zealand. Given that the international examples are recent, this 
nexus is still relevant.  
 
The Copenhagen School’s Theory of Securitisation was used to understand the 
dynamics behind the Clark Government’s politicisation of energy security. As 
Chapter Two argued, Securitisation Theory understands that security is 
subjective and socially­constructed. This suited an analysis of energy security in 
New Zealand politics for two key reasons. First, scholars and policy­makers 
argue that energy security is a highly subjective and context­dependent concept. 
Second, there was evidence of debate and disagreement between politicians on 
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energy security. Securitisation Theory could also help understand the dynamics 
(and politics) behind the energy security rhetoric in New Zealand. Chapter Two 
highlighted that a politicisation is when an actor argues that an issue is salient 
enough (often through security rhetoric of risk or threat) to be elevated to 
political debate and governed within politics. This is different to a securitisation, 
when a security argument convinces audience that an issue is urgent and 
threatening enough to require emergency action above politics. The appeal of 
security arguments is not lost in politicisations. Threats and risks to national 
well­being are used to elevate energy security and climate change issues. This 
often results in these issues being governed within politics, rather than leading to 
securitisation. Furthermore, actors will draw on existing narratives, discourses, 
or contextual factors, in order to form an argument that will be convincing and 
more successful with an audience.  
 
Thus in Chapter Three, Securitisation Theory showed how a strategy of 
politicisation was used to support the Clark Government’s climate change policy. 
Energy security embodied risks in the international and domestic energy markets. 
A security argument was used to legitimise its initiative for stronger leadership 
in the energy sector. This leadership involved clarifying New Zealand’s energy 
future in support of its climate change objectives. The Clark Government sought 
to synthesise environmental and economic concerns through energy security. 
This informed and helped forge the whole­of­government approach to climate 
change. The politicisation of energy security played a central role in 
institutionalising common perceptions of risks to the energy system (and how 
they relate to climate change) through relevant departments. For instance, energy 
security became part of a strategic role in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade; seen as something that was integral to addressing both economic 
development and climate change concerns.  
 
It was understood from the analysis in Chapter Two that politicisation is an 
open­ended process that can have different political and policy impacts. 
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Applying Securitisation Theory to an analysis of the Key National Government 
confirmed this, insofar as its rhetorical politicisation prioritised a different 
concept of energy security in policy. Chapter Four showed that the Key 
Government adopted the energy security label, but shaped a different rhetorical 
argument in favour of its policy to develop all of New Zealand’s energy 
resources. Politicisation of energy security led to a dramatic shift between the 
Clark and Key Government’s energy policies. The Key Government did not use a 
security argument to support its initiatives (by highlighting risks to the energy 
system), nor was uncertainty in the energy market (to deliver energy resources) 
conveyed through the concept. Nevertheless they used a strategy of politicisation 
to elevate security of supply on the political agenda. This also used rhetoric of 
well­being and economic growth to support its policy focus on developing 
renewable, petroleum and mineral resources. Chapter Two showed how energy 
security can mean different things to different actors. In the case studies, even 
though the same term is used energy security means something quite different to 
the Clark and Key Governments respectively. Thus politicisation has been used 
to prioritise two different concepts of energy security in support of their distinct 
policy initiatives.  
 
The Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security supported its 
focus on energy system change. This aimed to help the country meet a domestic 
emissions reduction target and fulfil its international climate change 
commitments. The Key National Government’s rhetorical politicisation argues 
for the benefits to domestic and global energy security that a policy focus on 
mineral and petroleum resource development (as well as renewables) would 
bring. Again, similar trends can be seen in the international debate discussed in 
Chapter Two. In particular, politicisation of energy security can aim to help 
prompt change in the energy system for climate change policy. It can also stall 
this type of change. The rhetoric and intention of the Clark Labour Government 
was for robust energy system change.  
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As Chapter Five discussed, economic and political conditions were favourable 
enough for the Clark Government to push its climate change policy. 
Securitisation Theory helped show how its rhetorical politicisation of energy 
security drew on resonating conditions to support its policy initiatives. These 
conditions included risks to the energy system (in electricity generation 
particularly) that had arisen in early 2000s and that its concept of energy security 
embodied in the NZES 2007. The public were enjoying relative economic 
prosperity and were open to thinking about climate change issues. Yet given the 
strong free­market culture in the energy sector, and strong public resistance to its 
previous climate change policy initiatives, the Clark Government had to structure 
a convincing argument to win over the opposition. Securitisation understands 
that a security argument has tactical appeal because they can be powerful when a 
threat is invoked and legitimises a policy response.  Highlighting energy security 
risks and demonstrating how they could be addressed through climate change 
policy was at the heart of the Clark Government’s strategy. Energy security 
therefore, embodied a tactical move to further push to for energy system change 
through policy initiatives like the 90 percent renewables energy target.  
 
The Key National Government’s rhetorical politicisation of energy security is in 
part, a counter­argument to robust energy system change driven by climate 
change policy. Securitisation Theory enabled an understanding of what dynamics 
lay behind this move. Politicisation of energy security was used to prioritise a 
very different sort of change to the Clark Labour Government: the development 
of New Zealand’s fossil fuel resources, including oil, gas and coal. Concern for 
climate change was trumped by the election of the Key National Government 
and heightened public concern for the global financial crisis. The Key 
Government’s politicisation of energy security resonated with these conditions. 
First, the concept was informed by a more cautious approach to climate change 
negotiations and policy. Comparatively to the Clark Labour Government, the 
Key Government argued that they aimed to protect New Zealand’s economic 
interests by not pushing strong emissions policy prematurely. Energy security 
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was retracted from a whole­of­government approach to energy security risks and 
climate change, and institutionally centralised to the purview of the Ministry of 
Economic Development. The urgency rhetoric of climate change was not linked 
to energy security. The Clark Labour Government did this by framing risks to the 
energy system through an economic and environmental lens. The Key National 
Government’s retracted concept was primarily viewed through an economic lens. 
 
The Key National Government reinforced its argument for developing all 
resources by drawing on relevant international conditions of the energy market.  
Politicisation of energy security helped the development of its policy stance. A 
common theme in the international energy market cited in Chapter One, Three 
and Four, is that there is an increasing world demand for energy. There are 
particular concerns for whether the supply of petroleum can keep up with this 
rising demand as new easy­to­tap supplies begin to dwindle. More expensive 
and difficult exploitation of resources is needed. The Key Government politicised 
the issue of global energy security in the NZES 2011. Securitisation theory 
revealed that this was not just a case of New Zealand fulfilling its international 
role as a member of the IEA. First, in the NZES 2011 global energy security was 
synthesised with the domestic economic benefit of developing petroleum and 
mineral resources. Second, this rhetoric resonated with the constituency group 
who had initially criticised the NZES 2007. Energy market actors in gas, coal or 
oil exploration, expressed concerns for the future of their industries under the 
more robust climate change policy of the NZES 2007. This was targeted at the 
strategy’s clear focus on renewable resources. They also expressed concern for 
how this policy focus could threaten energy security. The NZES 2011 mirrors 
their concerns with its emphasis on security of supply and explicit prioritisation 
of developing all resources to include petroleum and minerals.  
 
The Key Government also faced resistance to its policy. Securitisation Theory was 
able to reveal this third dynamic that shaped the Key Government’s rhetorical 
politicisation in defence of its policy initiatives. Chapter Five demonstrated that 
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energy security is a contested issue between key stakeholders and market 
participants of energy policy. The Clark Government also had a constituency 
group who used similar energy security rhetoric to criticise the draft NZES 2010. 
The group argued for the need to address climate change by prioritising long­
term risks to the energy system. The Key Government also faced particular 
resistance to its emphasis on developing New Zealand’s petroleum and mineral 
reserves. Very public protests by Greenpeace erupted in New Zealand’s East 
Cape, where oil exploration was being carried out by the Brazilian company 
Petrobras. Global energy security was a new feature in the NZES 2011 not seen in 
the draft NZES 2010. In the NZES 2011 there was a heightened awareness for 
both energy security and climate change concerns. The rhetorical politicisation in 
the NZES 2011 elevated the concept of global energy security (in which New 
Zealand should contribute to through the development of petroleum and mineral 
resources) with that of domestic commitments to respond to climate change. 
Politicisation has clearly led to the salience of energy security rising on both 
Government’s agendas. Two different rhetorical politicisations of energy security 
however, show clear divergence in energy policy. 
 
The Copenhagen School does not comprehensively consider the variety of 
outcomes politicisation can have. Analysis of energy security in New Zealand 
politics reveals that politicisation is quite complex. The thesis shows that the 
politicisation of energy security in New Zealand has clearly resulted in a 
patchwork of different institutional and rhetorical moves by the Clark and Key 
Governments. Politicisation of energy security has aided the acceptance of their 
respective policies by giving clear signals to their constituency group and 
defending their strategies against criticism. Assessing whether politicisation has 
been good or bad towards the overall development of energy policy in New 
Zealand is a more contentious, and a speculative issue for analysis. It also reveals 
the limitations of Securitisation Theory analysis, particularly in regards to the 
impacts of politicisation. This is because of the Copenhagen School’s original 
mandate: it aimed to provide a framework to distinguish a security issue from 
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the widening of the security agenda to a broader range of issues (including 
economic, environmental and societal issues).320  As Walter B. Galliue, cited by 
Barry Buzan in People, States and Fear, states, ‘[w]ithin the International Relations’ 
sub­discipline security studies, security is regarded as being an “essentially 
contested concept”.’ 321  Buzan et al. sought to address the dynamics and 
difficulties of attaching the word security onto a greater variety of issues seen in 
recent times. 322   Their framework did broaden analysis of security from 
traditional military­political lens to include non­traditional security issues. Their 
purpose however, was quite specific. By providing an explanation of the 
processes and dynamics behind securitisations they aimed to clarify what a 
security issue is. 323  Thus their theory does not comprehensively address the 
effects of politicisations, particularly in relation to whether politicisation is a 
good or bad thing.   
 
There is perhaps no easy answer then, for the third question of this thesis: has 
politicisation of energy security helped or hindered the development of energy 
policy in New Zealand? First, what has happened in New Zealand is a far cry 
from a full securitisation. Based on the Copenhagen School this is a positive 
because security is negative, as it can be a catalyst for panic politics and 
legitimises special state power.324  Energy security is addressed within politics 
and remains subject to debate in New Zealand. Securitisation Theory has 
revealed the processes and dynamics behind the debate on energy security. 
Based on the theory, energy security has a legitimising role in the development of 
energy policy. The incumbent Government demonstrates that its policy continues 
                                                          
320 See Colin Innes & Simon Rushton, "Hiv, Aids and Security: Where Are We Now?," International 
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to address energy security, and its rhetoric defends new policy initiatives that 
may come under criticism. The analysis across Chapters Three, Four and Five 
showed that both Governments took a hard­line on what they thought was the 
best way to approach the challenges of economic growth, climate change and 
energy security. Both Governments faced resistance but neither dramatically 
changed their tack. Instead, they supported their respective policy stances by 
rhetorical politicisation of energy security. They were not completely successful 
in arguing their cases, and debate remains. The empirical analysis therefore 
demonstrates that politicisation of energy security in New Zealand has not lead 
to resolution on the issue. The Copenhagen School ask whether it is good or bad 
to securitise a certain issue, and place it in the realm of panic politics rather than 
normal politics. 325 But has politicisation, despite a lack of resolution in debate, 
hindered or helped over­all energy policy formation? 
 
Discussion 
 
Politicisation has stirred a necessary debate in New Zealand’s energy politics. As 
discussed in Chapters One and Two, in international politics there has been a 
heightened concern for energy security and climate change. Both have been 
elevated to the top of political agendas around the world. These issues are 
complex and present acute challenges for policy­makers. As noted in Chapter 
One, Nobuo Tanaka, Executive Director of the IEA, argues that the world is 
facing unprecedented uncertainty in the energy market. This is not just 
uncertainty in the market itself, but crucially in how governments will respond to 
the complexity of energy issues today in their energy policy.  
 
Given the salience of energy security in international politics and debate, New 
Zealand needed to bring these issues to debate at the domestic level. As 
highlighted in Chapter One scholars and policy­makers have argued that a 
simple definition of energy security is insufficient to meet today’s challenges. The 
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concept itself has to change. This is crucial to the development of a policy­
response to the fundamental challenges that climate change and the international 
energy market presents. New Zealand is not immune to risks that an uncertain 
energy future may present. Events, shocks or disruptions that highlight the 
vulnerability of the energy system do invoke major policy response. Examples of 
this include the wake of the 1973/74 and 1979 Arab Oil disruptions, or the major 
droughts of early 2000s that placed pressure on the hydro­dams and caused 
electricity prices to rise. Policy­makers and academics are aware that, in these 
events, the public will turn to the government to address threats when they arise. 
For instance, Shell International forecasts that the longer the delay in climate 
policy action, the more likely shocks become. 326  These shocks are primarily price 
shocks from knee­jerk policy responses to major events, such as the physical 
effects of severe storms or floods.327  If the current rate of greenhouse gases 
emitted into the atmosphere from the consumption of fossil fuels continues, the 
world will face unprecedented challenges from a dramatically altered climate 
system by 2100.328 Understanding and debating energy security risks is the first 
step to developing a policy response. It cannot be a standalone issue, given that 
today, energy is inexorably linked with addressing climate change.  
 
The concept of energy security in New Zealand politics currently has a 
traditional focus on a secure and reliable supply of energy. Chapter Four showed 
that a strategy of politicisation was used in NZES 2011 to elevate security of 
supply concerns. Security of supply is traditionally at the core of energy policy.329 
                                                          
326 Shell International BV, "Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050: An Era of Volatile Transitions," in Shell 
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This component of energy security has become inherent to the current model and 
is common as a strategy today insofar as management of supply is the dominant 
focus of policy, rather than management of demand.330 This stance was hardened 
after the controversies over the first draft strategy, and finalisation of the NZES 
2011. The inclusion of global energy security rhetoric in the latest strategy has 
bolstered the argument to supersede climate change concerns for the continued 
development and consumption of fossil fuels.  
 
This is not however, an anomaly in the world but in step with international 
trends. The depth of the financial crisis has led to political flip­flops elsewhere 
and intensified lobbyist pressure to respond to the crisis by developing 
indigenous resources. A report by the petroleum company Shell International 
gives the example of energy policy direction in the U.S. President Obama had 
initially decided to open more of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for drilling 
(prior to the moratorium on development after the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico.) This was to increase energy supply security and reduce 
imports from foreign states, and coincided with a stalling of climate legislation 
due to the difficult political environment left by the intense economic 
slowdown. 331  In this instance energy security rhetoric has hindered climate 
change policy development and therefore, energy system change. The report by 
Shell International states that, 
 
The recession has […] provided governments, anxious to weather 
the downturn, with opportunities to take regulatory measures. 
Concerns about employment, debt, economic competitiveness, 
energy security and climate change are now being used to justify 
this. These measures are accelerating or delaying energy system 
change, depending on the political or economic circumstances.332 
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Reflecting on this, the Clark Government’s rhetorical politicisation was sufficient 
enough to influence current energy strategy. There are still remnants of the Clark 
Government’s energy security rhetoric and climate change policy in place. First, 
the criticism of the draft NZES 2010 highlighted issues that had been politicised 
in Labour’s NZES 2007. The patterns in energy security debate (as shown in 
Chapters Three, Four and Five) are sufficient to suggest an influential interaction 
between the Clark Labour Government and its constituency. This was enough to 
build rhetorical resistance to the Key National Government’s politicisation.  
 
Second, the draft NZES 2010 did not recognise energy security and climate 
change as challenges. Comparatively the finalised version, the NZES 2011, did. 
While this was more often expressed in global terms, the energy security and 
climate change nexus has clearly remained in energy policy. Thus the Key 
Government justifies the allocation of government resources to support the 
development of regulatory frameworks for investment in appropriate renewable 
projects.333 In regards to petroleum and mineral resources, it aims to ensure that 
‘regulatory settings maximise the return to New Zealanders while also 
promoting safety, preventing harm and requiring environmentally­responsible 
practices.’334 These are both based on its assertion that using a wide range of 
resources will ‘help make New Zealand more resilient to fluctuating commodity 
prices, leading to improved energy security.’335 Both renewable resources, as well 
as petroleum and mineral resources, are given focus in the NZES 2011.  
 
The Clark Government’s institutional politicisation of energy security risks 
however, has not been retained. This has hindered coherent policy and energy 
system change based on a more urgent sense to address climate change. First, the 
Key Government retracted the energy security and climate change framework to 
the MED, as demonstrated in Chapter Four. Second, the Ministerial roles in 
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Energy and Climate Change were separated. Energy security no longer appears 
in the mandates of other government departments as it did under David Parker’s 
watch. The Clark Government’s whole­of­government approach has been stalled. 
Thus coherent policy development on climate change and energy, which are 
inexorably linked, is hindered. This is problematic insofar as a government focus 
on mineral and petroleum resources can develop contradictions with climate 
change policy. For instance, New Zealand’s climate change delegation must 
actively participate in negotiations with other developed and developing nations 
to resolve issues and encourage all to reduce emissions. Yet, domestic energy 
policy suggests that New Zealand is more than willing to develop its mineral and 
petroleum resources for export­earnings. Climate change negotiations aim to 
reduce the consumption of these very resources.  
 
Politicisation has indeed, lead to a political flip­flop on energy security and 
climate change in New Zealand energy policy. This is problematic not only for a 
coherent whole­of­government energy policy, but also for the energy sector. It is 
political uncertainty over risk that presents particular challenges for the domestic 
market. In regards to the electricity market structure and regulation, the 
investment company Infratil with holdings in TrustPower, stated that ‘[i]t is 
easier to forecast (and respond to) economic, resource or technology changes 
than changes in political inclination.’ 336  The market does respond to policy 
changes. The company states that it has ‘transitioned from anticipating that 
electricity would be increasingly generated by large coal/gas plants, to now 
expecting future electricity needs will largely come from renewable sources.’337 
There is uncertainty in the future of New Zealand’s energy policy, and to 
whether policies will be enhanced to ensure a secure, sustainable and 
decarbonised future. IEA executive director Nobuo Tanaka noted this as a key 
challenge over the long­term.338 The IEA report on New Zealand, released in 2010 
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stated that ‘in recent years, the energy policy environment has been marked by 
uncertainty. It is difficult to fully assess the long­term potential and effectiveness 
of energy policy when significant changes occur on a regular basis.’339 This was 
in reference to the review and revision of the NZES 2007 in order to create the 
draft NZES 2010. The IEA’s comments were based on the notion that it is 
governments, and how they respond to the twin challenges of climate change 
and energy security, ‘that will shape the future of energy in the longer term.’340 
The NZES 2011 though finalised, has changed in semantics but not in content. It 
maintains a focus on developing renewable, petroleum and mineral resources.  
 
Politicisation is not a hindrance to substantive energy policy development. 
Analysis of New Zealand’s energy policy and debate suggests that energy 
security is more a case of rhetoric banter. First, some core issues have not 
changed between the Governments’ energy policies. New Zealand is relatively 
self­sufficient when it comes to energy, except for its reliance on access to the 
international energy market. While the Clark Government presented this reliance 
as a potential source of risk to New Zealand’s economy and energy security, the 
NZES 2011 released under the Key Government perceived it as a source of 
opportunity for export and development. But developing New Zealand’s 
resources, including gas, oil, and coal, is nothing new to energy policy. Both 
governments have made movements in these areas. The Clark Government 
supported petroleum exploration in New Zealand in its 2005 Minerals 
Programme for Petroleum.341 Likewise, under the Key Government the process of 
review and implementation of the National Policy Statement on renewables is 
underway. The Executive Summary of the ‘Proposed National Policy Statement 
for Renewable Electricity Generation,’ released by the Ministry for the 
Environment, states the following, 
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Assuming no change in New Zealand’s approach to electricity 
generation transmission and consumption, electricity­related 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are projected to rise by 50 per cent 
by 2030. The government believes this would not only be 
environmentally irresponsible, but that it would place New Zealand 
exports at a disadvantage, increase the country’s exposure to the 
cost of imported fossil fuels and threaten New Zealand’s reputation 
as a clean, green tourist destination. As such, the government has 
adopted a target for renewable electricity generation of 90 percent 
by 2025 (based on delivered electricity in an average hydrological 
year).342 
 
While not couched in terms of energy security, clearly the question of electricity 
generation in New Zealand is viewed through both environmental and economic 
lenses. Second, there is a recognition that the energy system does need to change 
and that business­as­usual will not suffice. This points to the fact that the politics 
of energy security is more to do with window­dressing of energy policy rather 
than representative of a substantive policy shift. Dr Richard Hawke argues that 
the NZES 2007 and 2011 can be viewed as quite different, or not different at all, 
adding that ‘the core issues have not changed much, just about which issue has 
primacy.’343  
 
Politicisation is a strategy that aims to prioritise one issue above another in 
political debate. And, this is exactly what has occurred between the two 
Governments. The traditionally passive role energy security plays in public 
debate and policy means it’s currently political fodder; something that follows 
the latest trends (climate change policy or a global economic recession), as seen in 
the two distinct rhetorical politicisations of energy security in the NZES 2007 and 
NZES 2011. Current strategy suggests that consideration of environmental and 
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social risks are the subject of political spin. Politicisation of energy security 
contributes to this spin. For instance, the contribution of New Zealand’s 
development of petroleum and mineral resources to global energy security is like 
a drop in the ocean of an enormous, and growing, international demand for 
energy. Likewise, arguing that a reduction in our greenhouse gas emissions is 
like a drop taken from the ocean of another enormous problem on the global 
scale. 344 Yet energy security issues are not left from scrutiny and debate, despite 
the spin.  
 
In parliamentary Order Paper and Questions, on 23 September, the Hon Trevor 
Mallard inquired with the Minister of Energy and Resources, the Hon Gerry 
Brownlee, whether he had read the documents released by the UK Industry 
Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security including ‘The Oil Crunch: Securing 
the UK’s Energy Future’ and ‘The Oil Crunch – a wake­up call for the UK 
economy?’345 These reports argue that the world will face an ‘oil crunch’ where 
‘oil prices are likely to be both higher and more volatile, and where oil price 
shocks have the potential to destabilise economic, political and social activity.’346 
The reports highlight that addressing this crunch, and the urgency required to 
address the impacts of climate change, mean that government and businesses 
must ‘Act now.’ 347  In October 2010, a New Zealand Parliamentary Library 
Research Paper entitled ‘The next oil shock?’ stated that ‘[t]here is a risk that the 
world economy may be at the start of a cycle of supply crunches leading to price 
spikes and recessions, followed by recoveries leading to supply crunches.’348 
Furthermore, domestic oil production cannot insulate New Zealand from these 
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shocks, and that key­export­generating industries such as tourism, dairy and 
meat exports are very vulnerable to these shocks. 
 
The thesis shows that the energy debate in New Zealand is evolving and slowly 
becoming more robust. The politicisation of energy security has not hindered this 
debate, shown in the continued points of contention that exists between 
politicians, bureaucrat, key stake­holders in energy policy, energy market 
participants and academics. For instance, Professor Barry Barton states that 
signals of pending scarcity in the Maui gas and electricity issues in New Zealand, 
‘have not translated well into investment and development.’ 349  He argues that 
because of this, policy­makers and business must take this message to heart. The 
‘Business as usual – characterised by ever growing energy consumption that is 
met from environmentally and socially damaging energy­supply­side projects – 
simply cannot continue, in the long­term, we cannot drill, dam and dynamite our 
way to energy security.’350 In recent national news, Professor Ralph Sims argues 
that currently New Zealand is not fulfilling its potential for renewable energy use, 
with little to encourage growth in that area.  While renewable energy use was 
growing globally, in New Zealand ‘cost, awareness and policy leadership were 
all barriers.’351 In opposition to this, the acting Minister for Energy and Resources 
Hon Hekia Parata stated that the Government ‘is focused on renewables, the 
exploration of natural resources, energy efficiency and the pricing of carbon 
while managing environmental responsibilities and economic opportunities,’ 
finally, that the Government retains the aspiration of 90 percent of electricity 
generation to be from renewables sources by 2025.352 Notably in these more 
public debates energy security is not often referenced directly.  
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The low public awareness of energy issues in New Zealand however, is a 
problem that needs to be addressed. Rhetorical politicisation of energy security 
has neither helped nor hindered this. First, Professor Ralph Sims identified low 
public awareness of energy issues as a key problem in New Zealand. He added 
that there will be ‘no change in policy unless [there is] a change in public 
attitude.’353  If the Clark Government wanted to raise the salience of climate 
change and energy security issues in the public’s minds, clearly the current 
energy strategy suggests that this has not been successful. Energy security in 
particular, plays a passive role in the public debate on energy issues. It is more 
behind the policy­making doors, amongst key­stakeholders, bureaucrats and 
politicians, where the energy security and climate change nexus is contested (in 
these specific terms.) Yet more public challenges to energy policy are emerging 
from the business sector. The recent Pure Advantage Campaign spear­headed by 
top New Zealand business leaders Sir Stephen Tindall, Philip Mills, and Rob 
Morrison, is an example of this. They argue that environmental degradation and 
policy in New Zealand is ‘eroding our 100% Pure image, and putting our crucial 
tourism and export industries at risk.’ 354 They call for thorough investigation on 
what motivates New Zealand to go green growth, and where the risks lie in 
running business as usual. 355  Furthermore, their campaign challenges a 
‘perceived lack of leadership on linking clean technology with protecting and 
making true New Zealand’s “clean, green” brand.’356 Note here that this public 
debate does not include references to energy security. Politicisation therefore, 
would appear negligible in hindering the development of this discourse. If 
anything, as Chapter Five suggests, it would stimulate it. As noted previously, in 
Securitisation Theory politicisation is when an issue is addressed within politics – 
meaning it is always open to debate.  
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The debate on energy security will simply not go away. And it is best New 
Zealand continues to have a critical debate that continues to question what 
energy security means, and how best it is achieved. The policy measures seem to 
be in place for this debate to take place with due consideration of climate change 
policy. Although, current rhetoric in the NZES 2011 shows that robust 
consideration has waned. The recent announcement that the Government is 
considering slowing down implementation of the Emissions Trading Scheme 
reflects this mood.357 The rhetorical politicisation of energy security seems to 
reflect this mood as well. Energy security rhetoric however, can easily morph 
into different forms depending on economic, social, and political conditions or 
indeed, sudden events and shocks. These conditions are not static in New 
Zealand, and change will occur. As the Introduction to this thesis highlighted, the 
energy security and climate change nexus has not been omitted from 
international debate. Energy security will not be assured without climate 
security. 358  Energy security should be questioned in New Zealand because 
climate change will continue to create challenges for energy policy. The 
Introduction also highlighted that the world’s energy future is uncertain, 
according to the IEA. The uncertainty the global energy sector faces is not only 
because of rising oil prices and rising global demand for energy, but also because 
of uncertainty in countries’ energy policy. There is an increasing urgency to give 
some clear and consistent signals (particularly for the energy market) in the 
present that will foreshadow the long­term policy response for the future.359 
 
New Zealand’s two distinct rhetorical politicisations of energy security have 
mimicked this uncertainty in domestic energy policy. This is not a problem 
solved by stating who is right; Labour, National or the energy sector. By no 
means is it a problem easily solved at all. However, in arguing that energy 
security risks are contested in New Zealand I have sought to show that energy 
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security should not be taken for granted. Neither when referenced by politicians 
and market actors, nor in the mandates of government departments. Recognising 
that energy security should be questioned (as by policy­makers and scholars 
internationally) is particularly important to New Zealand, as the country has 
enjoyed a free­ride and an abundance of renewable resources. New Zealand is in 
this position because of its good resources, not because of policy.360 Second, as 
Barry Barton notes energy security problems exist whatever the policy mix.361 It 
appears that politicisation of energy security has helped this debate, even though 
energy policy has flip­flopped from robust climate change policy to a focus on 
the development of petroleum and mineral resources. Despite the fact that 
energy security is to some extent portrayed as a straight­forward concept, the 
evolving energy debate will hopefully continue to suggest otherwise. 
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